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EXPLORING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY REGULATION OF PUBLIC-BENEFIT FOUNDATIONS IN EUROPE
With the strings tightening on government purses across Europe and the role 
and influence of non-profit organisations growing, a number of questions 
have been raised concerning the legitimacy of foundations in particular 
and whether existing public regulation and self-regulatory frameworks are 
enough to ensure that the sector is open and held accountable. Seeking to 
offer answers to these questions, the EFC and DAFNE mapped and analysed 
how the transparency and accountability of foundations is framed by legal 
and tax legislation and self-regulatory initiatives across Europe. We hope 
that the resulting study will prove a valuable resource for the sector.
However, this study is only the beginning. While the overall picture painted by 
the study’s findings is positive, there is inevitably some room for improvement. 
Foundations, with the support of peer networks and associations like DAFNE 
and the EFC, must take this opportunity to reinforce the good work that has 
already been done in the field of transparency and accountability; to improve 
our position with our many stakeholders and maintain foundations’ hard 
won reputation for integrity that has placed them among the most trusted 
institutions in society. 
This project also marks an important step in strengthening the strategic 
partnership between DAFNE and the EFC. By bringing the 6,000 plus 
members we represent together in this way, we aim to facilitate a broader, 
deeper understanding of the sector, both externally and among one another, 
and to amplify the voice of foundations throughout Europe. We are confident 
that this collaboration will be the first of many. 
Finally, we extend our sincere thanks to all who have contributed time, 
expertise, or resources in support of this initiative.
Gerry Salole   Rosa Gallego
Chief Executive Officer   Chair 
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EXPLORING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY REGULATION OF PUBLIC-BENEFIT FOUNDATIONS IN EUROPE
Applying this same general rule to foundations provides 
some serious food for thought, particularly given recent, and 
mounting, public scrutiny of foundation activities, spending, 
and influence. If foundations are not vigilant of their behaviour 
now, like the tardy colleague or the naughty teenager, they 
may be ruing the consequences later. This study therefore 
represents a first and important step to analyse whether, 
and to what extent, existing public regulations, as well as 
self-regulation efforts, are imposing suitably high standards 
of behaviour. To put it simply: Are foundations in Europe 
sufficiently transparent and accountable? 
For clarity’s sake, it is necessary to first define what is meant 
by these two complementary terms: 
TRANSPARENCY: An obligation or willingness of public-
benefit foundations to publish and make available relevant 
data to stakeholders and the public.
ACCOUNTABILITY: An obligation or willingness of public-
benefit foundations to account for their actions towards their 
stakeholders.
It must also be acknowledged from the outset that across the 
countries surveyed there are distinct differences in the ways 
that accountability and transparency are understood; thus 
there is no objective system of benchmarks against which 
regulatory effectiveness in this sense can be measured. Having 
said this, some general trends and cross-cutting conclusions 
did surface: 
•	 Accountability	 and	 transparency	 are	 “hot	 topics”	 both	
within the foundation sector and at the political level. During 
the last decade, many countries have amended their legal 
framework for foundations, affecting accountability and 
transparency regulations in a broad sense. Additionally, there 
are several ongo ing discussions about legal reforms: At the 
EU-level and in some Member States regulatory measures 
are being considered to prevent the abuse of NPOs, including 
foundations, for financial criminal purposes. 
•	 Specific,	formal	regulations	in	this	regard	are	imposed	with	
similar rationales across the countries surveyed: 
 (a) There is a perceived higher risk of financial abuse and 
mismanagement from foundations due to their unique 
governance structures. Unlike companies, foundations do 
not have shareholders to answer to. 
 (b) Foundations’ receipt of a specific public-benefit status 
and tax exemptions goes hand in hand with an increased 
requirement to answer to the public and the State. 
 (c) The ambitious public role and potential impact of 
foundations seems to attract a certain scepticism. 
•	 The	legal	comparative	analysis	illustrates	that	no	fundamental	
gaps exist in the legal framework for transparency and 
accountability of public-benefit foundations. In all countries 
a certain minimum standard is upheld and there are 
measures in place to ensure that foundations are pursuing 
the purposes for which they were set up. 
•	 While	 no	 fundamental	 gaps	 in	 legislation	 were	 detected,	
there may be room for improvement in some cases. 
Access to registration data, ensuring good governance, 
and effective reporting and supervision were highlighted in 
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
We are all answerable to someone. Whether that someone 
is a colleague, friend, spouse, or neighbour it is a fact of 
life: there is always someone waiting to appraise you. But 
while this responsibility for our actions is inevitable, the 
degree of accountability that is demanded often seems to 
have a direct correlation to the behaviour of the individual in 
question. For example, an employee who consistently meets 
deadlines is asked less by their boss to account for how they 
use their time than the disorganised colleague who is always 
late. A misbehaving teenager receives more questions from 




















some countries as elements of the regulatory framework 
to be improved upon. However, regulation should be 
proportionate and should not overburden foundations with 
unnecessary administration. An important tool to improve 
accountability and transparency is self-regulation, as is 
already in place in many countries. 
•	 Self-regulatory	mechanisms	are	 tailored	 tools	 to	optimise	
effective operations, accountability and transparency of 
public-benefit foundations through commonly accepted 
standards. In many countries one or more self-regulation 
initiatives already exist. However, self-regulatory tools tend 
to lack compliance mechanisms and there is generally a lack 
of monitoring of their application. 
•	 There	 is	no	need	for	European	regulation	on	the	matter.	
A	“one	size	fits	all”	solution	at	European	level	would	not	
be possible given the vastly differing legal traditions 
and cultures of the Member States. Transparency and 
accountability are achieved in a number of ways and 
through different mechanisms and concepts; there is no 
single model which could encompass this and harmonisation 
is neither a possibility nor a desired measure. Instead of 
harmonisation of national regulations, a new optional 
supranational legal form such as the currently discussed 
European Foundation Statute would be helpful, as it could 
serve as a benchmark of good governance within the EU 
and beyond. 
What do these conclusions imply for European foundations 
and the way forward? DAFNE and EFC members should be 
encouraged to openly discuss best practices, particularly 
in the implementation of self-regulatory mechanisms. This 
should be coupled with enhanced dialogue at national level, 
with governments and legislators, to influence the political 
debate about the role of foundations and to strategically 
position foundations as part of the solution, not part of the 
problem, in the policy arena. 
National governments need to be continually convinced of the 
need for a more enabling legal and fiscal environment for the 
sector. One way in which governments could improve the legal 
and fiscal environment for the sector would be by more widely 
applying the principle of proportionality in reporting and other 
transparency and accountability regulations. Foundations 
should also ideally be involved in the policy development 
process when it comes to addressing issues in NPO sector 
transparency and accountability. 
Moreover, the EU could take a more proactive role in assisting 
ongoing national processes by helping to inform stakeholders 
and share good practices from across the Member States. It 
would be worthwhile examining whether the EU could provide 
a platform for exchange of best practices among Member 
States. This could take several forms and could include a 
forum for dialogue, in order to promote accountability and 
transparency and serve as an ongoing resource for information 
and exchange. 
Overall, the snapshot provided by this study presents a 
positive image of European foundations’ efforts to be both 
accountable and transparent. But this must not foster a 
feeling of self-satisfaction or lead to the slippery slope of 
complacency. Public-benefit foundations in Europe must 
continue to be vigilant, following the formal regulations and 
fiercely upholding self-regulation. After all, in the end we all 
have to answer to somebody, and isn’t it preferable that this 
somebody isn’t a legislator with long rolls of red tape?
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In 2009, the European Foundation Centre (EFC) and 
the Donors and Foundations’ Networks in Europe 
(DAFNE) network together decided to review the issue 
of transparency and accountability of public-benefit 
foundations in Europe. 
EFC, DAFNE and their respective members have always 
strived towards transparency and accountability. Now, 
with increased political interest in the matter, they 
are even more committed to ensuring that existing 
regulatory and self-regulatory mechanisms are well 
designed and are being used to their full effect. 
This DAFNE/EFC study comes at a crucial political 
moment: EU institutions, as well as several national 
governments have in recent years sought to address 
the issue of transparency and accountability of non-
profit organisations (NPOs), particularly in the context 
of preventing the potential abuse of NPOs for financial 
criminal purposes and terrorist financing. 
The main objective of this study is to provide the 
foundation sector, public authorities, and other 
interested parties with an overview and analysis 
of regulatory and sector-developed self-regulatory 
approaches to ensuring the transparency and 
accountability of public-benefit foundations in 
Europe. It should be noted that this study did not 
survey individual foundation practices or policies and 
principles developed by individual foundations. This 
study also assesses the need for actions to enhance 
transparency and accountability of public-benefit 
foundations. 
The study seeks answers to the following questions: 
•	 What	 is	 the	 rationale	 behind	 having	 rules	 on	
transparency and accountability for public-benefit 
foundations, as organisations without shareholders?
•	 What	 is	 the	operating	environment	with	 regard	 to	
transparency and accountability for public-benefit 
foundations and their donors and funders, based 
on legislation and self-regulation? What are overall 
and recent trends? Are existing transparency and 
accountability mechanisms well designed and are 
they being used to their full effect? Can significant 
gaps be identified? 
•	 What	is	the	role	of	self-regulation?	What	can	be	said	
about the relationship between public regulation 
and self-regulation - are they considered as 
complementary tools in achieving an optimal state 
of accountability and transparency? 
•	 Is	there	a	need	for	more	action	at	the	level	of	the	
national or EU legislator, the foundation sector, and/





















1  Grundprobleme von Nonprofit-Organisationen/Key problems of non-profit organisations, Thomas von Hippel, Habilitation 2006.
2  However the ENRON scandal in 2001 shows that boards are just as vulnerable to mismanagement in for-profit companies or membership 
organisations.
2.1 WHAT ARE THE ARGUMENTS FOR  
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 
REGULATION?
Foundations are autonomous private entities 
established with private funds, so what justifies 
regulatory frameworks that demand accountability and 
transparency? Legal scholars and researchers have 
discussed this question taking into account the specific 
structure of foundations as asset-based and purpose-
driven organisations without owners and shareholders 
and have come up with several arguments in favour 
of such regulation, which are summarised as follows:
2.1.1 PRINCIPAL/AGENT THEORY
 There is a growing argument1 that the foundation 
sector should, like the corporate sector, adopt a 
“principal/agent”	 approach	 to	 how	 an	 organisation	
should be governed and controlled. In the corporate 
sector, transparency and accountability are considered 





agents may in some cases act more in their own interest, 
for instance though self-dealing (e.g. sell private real 
estate to the company at a very high price). Therefore, 
it is mandatory that decisions made by the board are 
transparent so that shareholders are informed and can 
react when decisions appear risky and or when the 
behaviour of the board is deemed negligent.2 
 Researchers are of the opinion that the essence of the 
“principal/agent”	theory	could	also	apply	to	foundations.	
However, there are some stumbling blocks, since the 
way	in	which	public-benefit	foundations	are	established	
and governed means that, unlike corporate entities 
with	shareholders,	they	do	not	have	“built-in”	structural	
mechanisms to avoid abuse. The good governance of a 
foundation essentially depends on the ethical standing 
of its board, so a foundation can be seen as more 
vulnerable to mismanagement than other types of legal 
entities. In the case of a foundation, who would be the 
stakeholder	or	“principal”	in	whose	interest	the	board	
acts?	Beneficiaries	can	claim	no	proprietary	rights	on	
the assets. Founders or donors dedicate their money 
to the purpose of the foundation and do not have any 
own economic interest in the foundation; their interest 
to exercise control is therefore not comparable to that 
of	 shareholders	 in	 a	 for-profit	 company.	 In	 addition,	
foundations are often set up for a very long period and 
in many cases in perpetuity, certainly going beyond 
their founders’ lifetimes. Therefore, even if one could 
argue that the founder does retain a vested interest 
in controlling board activities, this would hardly be 
maintained beyond his/her lifetime, hence the board 
acts on behalf of the foundation itself and not on behalf 
of	the	founder	or	beneficiaries.	This	specific	structure	
leads to a control issue which could be addressed by 
having regulatory frameworks on transparency and 
accountability and external supervisory structures. In 
particular in civil law countries, the argument is used 
that transparency and accountability are important 
tools to ensure that the will of the founder (i.e. the 
public-benefit	 purpose)	 and	 the	 foundation	 as	 an	
independent entity are protected against misconduct 
by the foundation board/other organs and misuse of 
the foundation funds. 
2.1.2 LEGAL SECURITY/CREDITOR PROTECTION
 To ensure overall legal security and creditor protection, 
a certain level of regulation related to accountability 
and transparency is already commonly required as a 
consequence of creating a legal entity. The granting 
of legal personality normally protects the capital of 
a foundation from the founders’/donors’ creditors. 
Regardless	 of	 a	 foundation’s	 specificities,	 any	 legal	
person may be required to present its basic data and 
annual accounts in a public register, as a means to 
ensure that credible information is provided to all parties 
with whom the foundation enters into contracts. As 
shown in the study (see section 3.4 Publicity, reporting 
requirements and auditing), virtually all European 
countries require that foundations prepare and submit 
2. RATIONALE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY  
 AND TRANSPARENCY REGULATION
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their annual accounts with a the competent authority. 
It should be noted that more substantial economic 
activities and/or fundraising activities may be subject 
to stricter or additional controls to ensure legal security 
and creditor protection. 
2.1.3 TAX EXEMPTIONS
	 In	 exchange	 for	 tax	 benefits,	 the	 state	 (including	
taxpayers) expects a foundation to undergo more 
detailed accountability requirements to show that 
it supports the general public interest. In short, 
governments give up part of their tax income 
because	public-benefit	foundations	benefit	the	whole	
community. In addition, the tax exemption is seen as 
an instrument for division of labour between the state 
and	 private	 actors	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 benefiting	 the	
general public. Private initiatives may therefore only 
receive tax privileges if they show in a transparent and 
accountable	manner	 that	 they	 benefit	 the	 public	 at	
large.
2.1.4. TRUSTEES FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD
 Many foundations aim to tackle problems in society and 
aim to bring about social change; therefore the public at 
large has a legitimate interest in obtaining information 
about foundations. 
2.1.5. ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST 
 Many foundations believe that there is an internally 
driven, ethical obligation to undergo such regulation, 
stemming	 from	 their	 mission	 as	 public-benefit	
foundations. Transparency and accountability 
are therefore considered essential parts of sound 
management practice, in particular in our information 
society and in times when foundations often work 
in partnership with other players.3 Often there 
are strategic considerations for foundations to be 
transparent and accountable and thus to maintain 
public trust in the sector. Foundations need to undertake 
efforts to prevent and anticipate scandal in a climate 
of	 increased	 suspicion:	 “The	 public	 is	 most	 likely	 to	
become	suspicious	when	it	is	uninformed...”4 In addition, 
being open to new ideas and to change in society will 
help foundations to improve their philanthropic activity 
and respond to new ideas and trends in society. 
 It should be noted that arguments in favour of 
transparency and accountability are subject to 
constraints	 imposed	 by	 the	 need	 for	 confidentiality	
regarding certain types of information that are usually 
protected under national laws, such as privacy of 
donors,	 funders	 and	 beneficiaries	 as	 well	 as	 trade	
secrets, patents etc. It is argued that some of the 
work foundations do, in particular in certain political 
environments, is more effective (and in some cases only 
possible) if the foundation leads from behind and does 
not disclose all information. Overall, the requirement 
for greater transparency of foundations has to go 
hand in hand with an understanding of the reality of 
foundations’ work; an understanding that foundations 
may sometimes wish to pursue innovative, or what 
some might consider more risky, actions, which they 
as independent organisations are uniquely privileged 
to be able to do. The fact that increasing transparency 
and accountability requirements can in turn increase 
the administrative burden on foundations is used as 
an argument against the introduction of new, overly 
complex regulation. 
2.2 WHAT IS ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
TRANSPARENCY REGULATION?
Transparency and accountability regulation refers to 
existing mechanisms, be they regulatory or self-regulatory, 
which answer the need for transparency and accountability 
of	public-benefit	 foundations.	These	mechanisms	relate	
in part to the governance and internal procedures of the 
foundation; however they primarily address publication 
and sharing of certain content with different stakeholders 
throughout	 the	 lifetime	 of	 a	 public-benefit	 foundation,	
e.g. in the process of establishment, later operations, in 
gaining a tax-exempt status etc. Furthermore, regulatory 
mechanisms seek to ensure compliance (supervision, 
sanctions) and safeguards for dissolution. As such, a 
range of regulatory areas are invovled, beyond foundation 
law	 itself	 -	 tax	 law,	 chairty	 or	 public-benefit	 legislation,	
accounting regulation, anti-money-laundering laws etc. 
Transparency and accountability are not only about 
sharing information but also about the process and the 
content of the information shared and what implications 
this has for the foundation and its stakeholders. 
3  Foundations in Europe, Society, Management and Law, Bertelsmann Foundation, 2001, pages 409-430.




















2.3 WHAT IS THE POLITICAL CONTEXT?
Over the past several years there has been an increased 
interest in regulating the NPO sector, including 
foundations, throughout Europe and in introducing 
more accountability and transparency into this sector.5 
Recent	research	has	identified	close	to	140	initiatives	on	
transparency and accountability from the 27 EU Member 
States and the European Economic Area (EEA), including 
over 65 public and over 70 self-regulatory projects.6 
Further research suggests that this trend has continued 
during the past two years. In addition to these initiatives, 
there is also a growing interest among pan-European 
institutions to guide their members in good regulatory 
practices. The most notable example of the latter is the 
Council of Europe, which adopted its Recommendations 
on the Legal Status of NPOs in Europe in 2007, and has 
since established an Expert Council to monitor compliance 
of its Member States with the recommendations.7
The latest research also shows that the key driving force 
behind such regulatory and self-regulatory initiatives has 
been the growing social and economic importance of the 
NPO sector. This is especially true for foundations, which 
have assumed an increased role in addressing social and 
economic problems in Europe over the past decade. As 
economies struggle and welfare states shrink across the 
continent, foundations are increasingly seen as important 
partners for the government in providing solutions to 
societal problems, and pushing and developing innovative 
ideas. In some areas, such as research, this has already led 
to partnerships formally expressed at EU level.8 
At the same time, part of the trend towards increased 
regulation comes in response to a perceived need across 
Europe and at EU level to safeguard NPOs against abuse 
for	financial	criminal	purposes	and	terrorist	financing.	This	
was	first	initiated	at	the	international	level	by	the	Financial	
Action Task Force9 with a Special Recommendation on Non-
profit	Organizations	in	2004.	This	was	followed	in	2005	
by a Communication of the European Commission that 
addressed the issue of transparency and accountability 
of NPOs.10	In	this	Communication,	a	“code	of	conduct”	for	
NPOs was proposed, an idea which was largely criticised 
by the sector. As a result, it was proposed to further 
assess the actual abuse of NPOs for criminal purposes 
and to analyse the existing regulatory and self-regulatory 
framework of NPOs with regard to transparency and 
accountability. 
Consequently, the EC commissioned two studies to explore 
the current situation relating to the vulnerability of NPOs 
to terrorist abuse in the EU.11 These studies point to the 
need for increased exchange and sharing of best practices 
among the Member States, but do not substantiate the 
need for EU-level regulation. In fact, the research found 
that proof of actual abuse of NPOs and foundations was 
limited. The research emphasises that the role of the 
EU	should	be	a	“facilitator”	and	potentially	a	“qualifier”,	
but	 not	 a	 “regulator”,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 transparency	
and accountability of NPOs. Currently, an overall EU 
regulation	seems	to	be	“off	the	table”	but	the	Commission	
is considering drafting EU guidelines for NPOs regarding 
their conduct in preventing, identifying and dealing with 
terrorist abuse.12 
Despite the general acknowledgment by the EU and 
national governments of the importance and influence 
of the NPO sector, there still remains concern in the 
international arena about the potential abuse of this sector 
and need for tighter regulation. Foundations therefore 
need to work in partnership with governments in order 
to determine what evidence exists of terrorist abuse and 
to tackle the complex problem of potential abuse in the 
context	of	terrorist	financing,	in	order	to	adopt	the	most	
effective solutions at national level.
5 For a thorough overview of recent European initiatives in this regard, see: Oonagh B. Breen, Through the Looking Glass: European Perspectives on Non-profit 
Vulnerability, Legitimacy and Regulation, Brooklyn International Law Journal, Volume 36, Issue 3, 2011, pages 947 - 991.
6 Study on Recent Public and Self-Regulatory Initiatives Improving Transparency and Accountability of Non-Profit Organisations in the European Union, 
ECNL, 2009, hereafter referred to as 2009 ECNL Study.
7  Council of Europe, Legal Status of Non-Governmental Organisations in Europe, CM/REC (2007) 14 (Oct. 10, 2007).
8 For example, the EFC Research Forum, formally known as European Forum on Philanthropy and Research Funding.
9  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was set up in 1989 by the G-7 summit with the mandate to propose measures to combat money laundering, and 
became the leading multilateral institution in developing standards in the fight against terrorist financing after 9/11 of 2001.
10  The Prevention of and Fight against Terrorist Financing through enhanced national level coordination and greater transparency of the non-profit sector. 
European Commission Communication (2005) 620 final - 29 November 2005.
11  Study to Assess the Extent of Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations for Financial Criminal Purposes at EU Level (Matrix, 2008) and 2009 ECNL Study.
12  Examples exist at national level also: The UK Charity Commission’s has developed a Counter-terrorism Strategy and guidelines for charities in implementing 
it. In addition, increased scrutiny of NPOs happens through general anti-money laundering regulation (e.g. Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, and even in 
European Neighbourhood countries). These examples were collected for the 2009 ECNL Study.





Note: ‘other’ includes: Cyprus (depends on the type of organisation), Germany 
(depends on federal state law), Ireland (registration with the Revenue 
Commission), Malta (register for legal persons), Netherlands (Register at Chamber 
of Commerce), UK (Charity Commission), Turkey (both court and state).
Is registration of a foundation required?









3. COMPARATIVE MAPPING OF 
 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
13  To conduct a comparative mapping and analysis of existing national laws with regard to transparency and accountability implies a certain challenge as 
different civil law and common law approaches, as well as different approaches to defining and interpreting legal terms, have to be taken into account.
14  Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, UK, and Turkey.
15  Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and Turkey.
16  France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Switzerland.
17  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, 
and Ukraine.
18  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine.
19 For example, the Charity Commission in the UK or a state run legal entities register in Lithuania.
20 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
For the purpose of comparative analysis, the existing 
legislative transparency and accountability rules for 
public-benefit	 foundations	 in	 some	30	countries	were	
mapped. The results of the mapping exercise are 
provided in this section.13
3.1 ESTABLISHMENT
Rules related to transparency and accountability 
already apply to the process of establishing public-
benefit	 foundations.	 The	 founder(s)	 have	 to	 define	
the key elements of the foundation: the purpose (in 
most	cases	public-benefit	purpose),	 the	assets/capital,	
and the organisational structure. The process may be 
linked to state approval and/or registration in a publicly 
accessible register, providing key information on the 
basic elements of the foundation. 
3.1.1 PURPOSE
All countries surveyed require foundations to be 
set	 up	 for	 a	 clearly-defined	 purpose,	 while	 in	 15	
countries14 foundations are permitted only for the 
pursuit	of	public-benefit	purposes.	In	most	countries,	
a description of a foundation’s purpose is publicly 
available. 
3.1.2 ASSETS/CAPITAL
In nine of the countries15 surveyed, legislation stipulates 
a	 fixed	 minimum	 capital	 for	 setting	 up	 a	 public	
-benefit	 foundation.	 In	 a	 further	 eight	 countries16, 
while	 no	 fixed	minimum	 capital	 is	 stipulated,	 there	
is usually in practice a minimum determined by the 
relevant State authorities. The relevant authorities 
usually	qualify	what	is	“reasonable”	in	correlation	to	
a foundation’s intended purpose. The public at large 
can therefore trust that in the majority of countries 
a	 public-benefit	 foundation	 owns	 a	 certain	 amount	




In 18 countries17, state approval/court registration is 
required	to	set	up	a	public-benefit	foundation.	State	
approval/court registration guarantees that the legal 
requirements for the establishment of a foundation 
are checked and reviewed by a State authority or a 
court. 
3.1.4 REGISTRATION, CONTENT AND PUBLIC 
AVAILABILITY OF THE REGISTER
Registration is required in almost all the surveyed 
countries18. In Germany, the requirement to register 
is determined in federal State law i.e. every State has 
its own form and process of registration. However 
in Greece and France, no explicit registration 
requirement exists.
In most countries, registration is carried out by the State 




















where registration with a court is required. In Turkey, 
registration is carried out by the court but with 
participation of the government. In the Netherlands, 
foundations are registered in the Register of Commerce, 
a private body. 
In 24 countries21,	public-benefit	foundations	are	logged	
in a register that is publicly available, giving access to 
key data on foundations, including details about the 
founder;	 the	 purpose,	 name	 and	 registered	 office	 of	
the foundation; and in many cases information about 
the starting assets and the names of board members. 
Information about the dissolution is frequently also kept 
in the foundation register, or the foundation is removed 
from the register in case of dissolution.
However, in some countries these registries – while they 
are public by law - are not easily accessible, especially 
where registration lies with the local courts. For instance, 
in	Hungary	there	is	no	centrally	available	official	registry	
and, since monitoring is weak, court data are often 
obsolete.
3.2 PUBLIC-BENEFIT STATUS AND 
REQUIREMENTS FOR TAX EXEMPTION
Transparency and accountability are inherent aspects of 
the	regulatory	framework	for	the	public-benefit	and	tax	
status of foundations. To become tax-exempt, a foundation 
must share its information with either its country’s tax 
authorities or (in cases of automatic exemption) the 
foundation authority. As both authorities act on behalf 
of the wider public, they have a vested interest to see to 
it that a foundation that receives tax exemptions does 
actually	 pursue	 its	 public-benefit	 purpose.	 In	 case	 a	
foundation	 does	 not	 pursue	 its	 public-benefit	 purpose,	
it	runs	the	risk	of	losing	its	public-benefit	status	and	tax	
exemptions.
In the majority of countries surveyed, foundations must 
request special recognition from the tax authority22. 
However, in 6 of the 30 countries surveyed23, tax exemption 
is automatic (i.e. given in relation to the legal form of a 
foundation). In these countries registration requirements 
are stricter, for instance state approval is required24, and/
or there is a minimum capital requirement25, and/or 
foundations	 can	 only	 be	 established	 for	 public-benefit	
purposes.
In some European countries26 basic tax exemptions, such 
as	the	exemption	from	income	tax	on	non-profit	income	
(grants and donations) are granted to a foundation as a 
legal	form,	while	a	special	public-benefit	status	provides	
access	 to	 additional	 tax	 benefits	 for	 the	 organisation	
(e.g. exemptions on income from economic activities) 
and	possibly	 for	 the	donors	 to	and	beneficiaries	of	 the	




with this status beyond tax exemptions. In these countries 
foundations	 have	 to	 first	 file	 a	 request	 for	 the	 public-
benefit	status	with	the	competent	court,	commission	or	
State authority; and once they have received the status, 
they may register with the tax authority to receive tax 
exemptions28. In other countries29,	 there	 are	 specific	
benefits	and	related	conditions	(obligations)	enlisted	in	the	
tax laws that confer the tax exemptions on foundations. In 
these	cases,	foundations	usually	have	to	file	the	request	
for exemptions to the tax authorities themselves. 
Generally, tax-exempt foundations have to provide 
evidence	 to	 the	 tax	 authorities	 through	 their	 financial	
and/or annual reports that the money/income is spent on 
public-benefit	purposes.	In	the	majority	of	countries,	they	
must demonstrate the following: 
21 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK, and Switzerland.
22	Such	recognition	is	made	using	an	explicit	status	such	as	“public-benefit	organisation”,	“charity”	(UK),	ONLUS	(Italy),	ANBI	(the	Netherlands):	Voluntary	
Organisation (Malta), etc.
23 Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Luxembourg, and Slovenia.
24 Belgium, Cyprus, France, and Luxembourg.
25 Czech Republic, Finland, and Malta.
26 Belgium, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
27 Bulgaria, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, and UK.
28 In the Netherlands, it is the tax authority itself that decides on the request for an ANBI (public-benefit) status. Also, it is not always necessary to register 
separately with the tax authority upon receiving the status (e.g. this is not needed in Bulgaria).
29 Germany, Slovakia, Estonia, Turkey, and Ukraine.
EXPLORING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY REGULATION OF PUBLIC-BENEFIT FOUNDATIONS IN EUROPE
3.2.1 PUBLIC-BENEFIT PURPOSE AND BENEFITS TO 
THE PUBLIC AT LARGE
Foundations	have	to	pursue	a	public-benefit	purpose,	
as stipulated in foundation law or in order to receive 
tax exemptions. Countries have differing practices 
as	 to	 how	 such	 purposes	 are	 defined.	 While	 some	
countries	 have	 no	 clear	 definition,	 such	 as	 is	 the	
case in Cyprus, more often than not, guidelines are 
stipulated in law or other regulations describing what 
can	constitute	a	public-benefit	purpose.	These	almost	
always include a list of the purposes as potential areas 
of activity of the foundation. While most countries 
have an open list with listed case examples, some tax 
laws	have	a	closed	list	of	public-benefit	purposes.	
The	tax	law	definition	of	a	public-benefit	purpose	will	
often include conditions related to the target group 
(e.g. the public or a part of it; the needy or marginalised 
etc.) and conditions related to the dominance 
or exclusivity of pursuing these purposes (e.g. 
Netherlands, Germany, and UK). The most common 
criterion, found in 1630 countries, is that the activities of 
a	public-benefit	foundation	have	to	benefit	the	“public	
at	large”.	
3.2.2 NON-DISTRIBUTION CONSTRAINT 
In the vast majority of countries31, foundations are 
required by law (in most cases by tax law) to follow 
a	non-distribution	constraint.	This	means	that	benefits	
cannot be distributed either directly or indirectly to 
any founder, donor, board member or employee of the 
foundation. 
3.2.3 ASSETS IN CASE OF DISSOLUTION
In almost all countries, by law the assets of a public-
benefit	foundation	cannot	revert	to	private	ownership	
upon its dissolution32. In case of dissolution, the 
assets	 must	 be	 used	 for	 public-benefit	 purposes.	
Most commonly, this is to take place by the transfer 
of the assets to another organisation with the same 
or similar purpose to that of the dissolved foundation. 
3.2.4 REASONABLE ADMINISTRATION COSTS 
In seven of the countries surveyed, the legislation 
refers to a maximum that can be spent on 
administration costs33. In an additional seven 
countries34, it is indicated that administration costs 
must	 be	 “reasonable”	 or	 “bona	 fide”.	 In	 Germany,	
many of the local (state-level) foundation laws 
demand that administration costs should be as 
low as possible. Meanwhile, in Slovakia, although 
no maximum amount for administration costs 
is	 specified,	 these	 costs	 must	 be	 accounted	 for	
separately.
3.2.5 TIMELY DISBURSEMENT OF INCOME
In	 all	 30	 countries,	 public-benefit	 foundations	 are	
either required by foundation law or tax law to spend 
their	income	for	public-benefit	purposes.	The	majority	
of countries do not stipulate when this spending 
must occur. In ten countries35, however, there are 
requirements concerning the timely disbursement of 
income.
3.2.6 ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND FUNDRAISING  
ACTIVITIES
Foundation and tax laws may require more scrutiny 
where foundations undertake economic activity and 
fundraising. 
3.2.7 INCREASED ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN FOR 
CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITIES 
A total of 16 countries36 surveyed by the study 
show	 that	 a	 foreign-based	 foundation	 can	 benefit	
from the same tax breaks as a national foundation. 
Most	 countries	 grant	 tax	 benefits	 to	 “comparable”	
foreign foundations, however there is increased 
administrative burden for a foreign foundation 
to show that it is indeed comparable to a local 
counterpart. 
30 Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Spain, UK, Switzerland, and Turkey.
31 Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, and Ukraine.
32 There are several exceptions: in Hungary and in Lithuania, the initial sum of foundation assets may revert to the founders (except for foundations with 
a public-benefit status in Hungary); Latvia, Netherlands and Portugal leave the distribution of assets to the statutes of the foundation but include some 
limitations to ensure that the original goals are achieved.
33 Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Latvia, Spain, Turkey and Ukraine.
34 Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, and Switzerland.
35 Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, Turkey, and Ukraine.




















3.2.8 DONOR/RECIPIENT REPORTING  
REQUIREMENTS 
Tax authorities (in the interest of the general public) 
also	 receive	 information	 about	 public-benefit	
foundations via reporting obligations of donors. Most 
countries prescribe certain requirements in order for 
donors	 to	 claim	 tax	 benefits	 on	 their	 donations	 to	
public-benefit	foundations.	Donors	wishing	to	receive	
tax breaks normally have to report on the donation in 
their annual tax returns. However, in Estonia, Finland, 
and Portugal, the recipient is also required to submit 
a	 “matching”	 report	on	 the	donors.	 In	 the	UK	and	
Ireland, the recipient charity may also claim all or 
part	of	the	tax	benefit,	for	which	they	need	to	submit	
proper documentation. In the UK, donors must also 
provide	 proof	 that	 any	 benefits	 received	 do	 not	
exceed the allowed sum. 
In	most	countries	donors	have	to	submit	a	“receipt”	
from the recipient foundation in support of their 
claim. This can be quite onerous to provide, as is the 
case in Hungary where it entails a lot of bureaucracy. 
Bulgaria requires a contract between the donor and 
beneficiary,	 while	 in	 Poland	 a	 bank	 transfer	 from	
the donor is enough proof. Greece has an especially 
strict regime: to prove the details of the transaction 
every donation exceeding €300 must be deposited in 
an account opened for this purpose, and a voucher 
issued by the bank and signed by the donor. The tax 
authorities may, in many countries, require more 
detailed information/proof upon request, according 
to the law. 
3.3 GOVERNANCE
As a general rule, the founder(s) have freedom to design 
the internal governance structure of a foundation, but 
the law gives them some guidance as to what needs 
to be addressed. For instance, private supervisory 
mechanisms, e.g. supervisory boards, monitoring 
by auditors or other third parties, are mandatory in 
several countries. This is especially true in countries 
where the position of the State supervisory authority is 
comparatively weak. 
3.3.1 SUPERVISORY BOARD
A total of ten countries37 legally require some form 
of a supervisory body, the tasks of which usually 
include control over the governing board, as well as 
the appointment of an auditor and the board. Only 
Estonia and Portugal require all foundations to have 
a supervisory board in addition to a governing board. 
Four38 countries require foundations with a public-
benefit	 status	 to	 have	 a	 supervisory	 board,	 while	
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary stipulate a 
supervisory body for larger foundations. In Hungary, 
the obligation to have a supervisory board applies 
only	to	organisations	which	both	hold	public-benefit	
status and have budgets of a certain size. In Austria 
meanwhile, supervisory boards are only required for 
private foundations.
3.3.2 GOVERNING BOARD 
Approximately half of the surveyed countries39 require 
a foundation to have a collective governing body, with 
more than one board member. Most countries where 
this is regulated prescribe at least three members for 
the board of directors. Portuguese legislation simply 
states that there must be an uneven number of board 
members, and in the Czech Republic the number has 
to be divisible by three.
 
In most countries, the board can be composed of 
individuals as well as legal entities, with the exception 
of some cases40	 that	 only	 allow	 “natural	 persons”.	
Generally, the founder is allowed to be a member of 
the board; however in Hungary, he/she along with his/
her relatives must be in the minority, while in Sweden 
a founder cannot be the sole board member. 
37 Austria, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine.
38 Bulgaria, Italy, Poland and Ukraine.
39 Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and UK.
40 Austria for public-benefit foundations, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, and Latvia.
EXPLORING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY REGULATION OF PUBLIC-BENEFIT FOUNDATIONS IN EUROPE
The founder is free in most of the countries surveyed 
to	 define	 in	 the	 statutes	 how	 board	members	 are	 
appointed, and he/she usually makes the initial 
appointments. The power to appoint new board 
members can rest with the founder; with another 
natural or legal person; with the supervisory board 
of the foundation; or with the members of the 
board of directors (co-option system, also called a 
self-perpetuating board). 
Only a small number of countries have mandatory 
rules regarding board appointments. For instance, 
in Denmark, the majority of the board members 
of commercial foundations must be persons not 
appointed by the founder or his/her family. Meanwhile in 
Austria, the initial members of the board 
of	 directors	 of	 a	 public-benefit	 foundation	
are appointed by a supervisory authority. 
In Hungary, only the founder or his/her successor 
may appoint or remove board members for the entire 
lifetime of the foundation.
3.3.3 DUTY OF CARE/LOYALTY
Generally, the governing board has the task of properly 
managing the foundation and to ensure that the public-
benefit	purpose	is	pursued.	The	board	represents	the	
foundation among third parties. In most countries, this 
representation function may be delegated to a director 
or	officers	of	the	foundation.	The	duty	of	care	and	the	
duty of loyalty of board members are recognised in all 
surveyed countries and are part of the respective legal 
provisions. 
The	 duty	 of	 loyalty	 arises	 out	 of	 the	 “principal/
agent”	 theory41 (see discussion in Section 2). As 
principals, the founders have not simply delegated 
the management to the board but have been 
superseded by the foundation itself. The board 
therefore is accountable to the foundation (and 
not	 to	 the	 founder	 nor	 to	 the	 beneficiary,	 neither	
of whom can claim proprietary rights). Because the 
foundation owns itself and has no external owners/
shareholders, controlling mechanisms become a 
crucial aspect of a foundation’s functioning. Experts 
describe the duty of loyalty as a normative attempt 
to counterbalance the natural self-interest of board 
members. The duty of loyalty is provided for within 
the reviewed legislations, with rules on conflict of 
interest and non-distribution constraint42. Legislation 
also regulates the remuneration of board members. 
Almost all countries set limitations on the extent to 
which board members may be remunerated43, while 
remuneration	is	prohibited	in	five	countries44. 
The duty of care implies that board members 
must use their own skills to diligently manage the 
foundation. This duty is implemented by national 
legislation in different ways. Board members must 
ensure	 that	 the	 public-benefit	 purpose	 is	 pursued,	
taking into account the deed/statutes/law and the will 
of the founders. While board members have the right 
to amend foundations’ statutes in the majority of 
countries, when doing so the foundation laws usually 
require that board members take into account the 
original will/intention of the founder. Members of the 
board are in most countries personally liable in cases 
of losses caused by (at least) grossly negligent acts 
or wilful defaults on their part (breach of duty). The 
liability of board members aims to ensure board 
members’ duties of care and loyalty, in particular 
proper management of foundations’ activities and 
assets	and	pursuance	of	their	public-benefit	purposes.
3.4 PUBLICITY, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
AND AUDITING
All 30 countries surveyed require foundations to prepare 
annual	reports	and	annual	accounts/financial	records,	and	
most	countries	require	them	to	be	filed	with	the	relevant	
authorities. However, there are great differences between 
the content and form of these reports and how these are 
41 See Doralt/Hemström/Kalss in European Foundation, a new legal approach, Hopt/Walz/Hippel, 2006, pages 136 and following with further references.
42 Described in section 3.2.2 of this study.
43 Spain (with prior State approval) and Switzerland allow financial implications for services/activities beyond the regular board member duties. Other countries 
such as Slovakia and France, allow for reimbursement of expenses only; no compensation or fee is provided for any kind of work for the foundation. Many 
countries allow a reasonable level of financial remuneration (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Sweden). In Denmark, the State supervisory authority 
may check whether the remuneration is appropriate and can reduce any remuneration deemed excessive. Austria requires approval by the foundation 
authority for any remuneration of board members by public-benefit foundations.




















submitted and made available for the public, as well as 
the extent of reporting (e.g. whether an audited report 
is needed or not). In fact, while overall foundations are 
required to account for their annual activities there is no 
identifiable	trend	in	Europe	as	to	what	constitutes	good	
practice with regard to reporting, and some gaps still exist. 
3.4.1 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Financial information
Public-benefit	 foundations	 are	 required	 to	 prepare	
financial	information	in	all	surveyed	countries	and	in	
general	must	file	this	with	one	or	more	authorities.	
However, in Hungary, Malta and the Netherlands 
there is no general requirement for foundations 
to	 file	 their	 annual	 financial	 reports,	 although	
in all three countries, foundations with a public-
benefit	 status	 must	 submit	 their	 financial	 reports.	 
In eight countries45, foundations are required to 
report	 on	 financial	 information	 only,	 either	 in	 the	
form of annual budget/balance sheet, audited/
unaudited	annual	accounts,	or	financial	report.	
Half of the surveyed countries46	 have	 specific	
accounting rules for foundations. In Belgium, for 
example, the accounting rules47 are foreseen with 
different regimes for small and for large associations 
or	foundations.	Similarly,	in	Finland,	the	law	specifies	
what information the audit report should contain, 
namely whether the assets of the foundation have 
been properly invested; whether the fees paid to 
the members of the bodies of the foundation are 
to be deemed reasonable; and whether the annual 
accounts and the annual report give a true and fair 
view	of	the	finances	and	activities	of	the	foundation.	In	
both the UK and Ireland, it is the respective Charities 
Act that makes provisions related to foundations’ 
accounting48. In the Netherlands, only fundraising 
entities	that	have	received	a	specific	certificate	(CBF-
Keur) are required to make accounts following Dutch 
accounting rules.
In	 France,	 specific	 rules	 for	 associations	 and	
foundations, including particular regulations relating 
to registration of gifts, donations and legacies, 
are found in the accounting regulation49. Swedish 
foundations	 are	 also	 subject	 to	 specific	 accounting	
regulations, but only with regard to certain aspects. 
German legislation provides minimum accounting 
standards in the German civil code (BGB), while every 
state (Bundesland) requires foundations to issue an 
annual	 financial	 report	 (Jahresabrechnung)	
containing a statement of assets and liabilities50. In 
Turkey, it is the General Directorate of Foundations (the 
foundation supervisory authority) that determines 
the rules and regulations in accordance with which 
foundations are obliged to keep their accounting 
records. In Italy, foundations of banking origin 
have	 specific	 accounting	 rules	 foreseen	 by	 Decree	
n.153/1999 and subsequent administrative acts. 
Annual activity report
More than half of the surveyed countries51 also 
require the submission of a report on the activities 
of	the	foundation.	In	countries	where	a	public-benefit	
status exists, activity reporting is usually part of 
the annual report, in which there can be additional 
requirements relating to the use of budgetary 
resources or a demonstration of compliance with the 
public-benefit	status	requirements.	
Annual action plan
In countries such as Latvia and Spain, foundations 
are required to submit an annual action plan to the 
administrative authority, in addition to their annual 
report.
45 Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Romania, and Ukraine.
46 Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain (specific rules based on the general 
accounting rules)Sweden, UK, and Turkey.
47 Law of 17 June 1921 on associations and foundations.
48 In the UK, this is supplemented by the Charities Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP). The Charities (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008 
require the methods and principles of SORP to be followed when accounts are prepared under the 1993 Act, although there are variations to this according 
to the type of organisation concerned. Exempt charities must keep proper accounting records and prepare accounts following the SORP, although they are 
not required by law to prepare an annual report. They must also provide copies of their accounts to members of the public on request.
49 CRC 99-01, as amended by the opinion no. 2009-01 issued by the National council for accountancy (Conseil national de la Comptabilité).
50 In addition, some Bundesländer demand that foundations comply with the Generally Accepted German Accounting Principles and or issue an annual 
activity report (Tätigkeitsbericht).
51 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain (included in annual accounts), 
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and Turkey.
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Reporting	on	specific	issues
Further reporting is required in some countries on 
fundraising activities (e.g. France and Poland); on 
the	remuneration	of	directors	and	officers	(Hungary,	
Slovakia); on the donations received and the grantees 
(beneficiaries)	 who	 were	 supported	 (e.g.	 Czech	
Republic	 and	 Slovakia).	 In	 Ukraine,	 public-benefit	
foundations must report to donors on the use of their 
donations, demonstrating that the donations were 
used according to the donors’ requests. In Ireland 
and the UK, reporting is differentiated according 
to a charity’s budget size52. In Ireland, for example, 
charities with a budget under €100,000 may submit 
a	 simplified	 version	 of	 the	 annual	 accounts,	 while	
no report is required for those with a budget under 
€10,000.
3.4.2 PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS
The majority of countries stipulate that foundations’ 
financial	 or	 activity	 reports	 should	 be	 publicly	
available, with ten53 countries stipulating that all 
information disclosed to the authorities should 
also be in the public area. In Slovakia, although 
there are more detailed requirements for reporting, 
it is only the auditor’s report that is published, 
appearing	 in	 the	 official	 Commercial	 Journal.	 In	
the UK, annual accounts of most foundations are 
published on the Charity Commission website: the 
amount of information included is greater for larger 
foundations, while charities are only required to make 
their accounts and reports available to the public 
upon	request.	However,	in	five	countries54 reporting 
does not have to be made public, while in a further 
six countries only certain types of foundations are 
required to publish their reports55. 
3.4.3 AUDIT REQUIREMENTS
Auditing is mandatory for all foundations in seven 
of the surveyed countries56, and for practically all 
foundations in a further three countries57. In 12 
countries, a foundation’s size determines whether it 
is subject to an audit. Size is most often determined 
by annual income and/or assets58 and in some 
countries also by the number of people employed 
by the foundation59. In a few countries, the type of 
foundation is the factor determining whether an audit 
would be required60. There are only seven countries61 
where there is no audit requirement.
52 Principle of proportionality.
53 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, and Romania.
54 Austria, Germany, Latvia, Slovenia, and Turkey.
55 Commercial foundations only in Denmark and Netherlands; foundations with a public-benefit status only in Hungary; foundations of banking origin only in 
Italy; foundations registered as voluntary organisations only in Malta; and only larger foundations that conduct business and those set up by the State must 
do so in Sweden.
56 Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Slovakia and Sweden.
57 In the Czech Republic all foundations and the larger endowment funds are subject to audit obligations. In France, public-utility foundations and corporate 
foundations, as well as larger endowment funds must have an auditor. In Switzerland, there is a general obligation for foundations with certain exceptions for 
smaller organisations and family and church-related foundations.
58 Bulgaria, Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Sweden and UK.
59 Hungary (in case of Public Benefit Organisations), Poland, and Spain.
60 Private foundations in Austria; commercial foundations in Denmark and the Netherlands; and foundations with a tax-exempt status in Turkey.
61 Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Ukraine.
Yes
No
Note: the chart lists a country as 'yes' in instances where at least one 
major category of foundation needs to publish e.g. Hungary here is ‘yes’, 
even though it is only tax exempt public-benefit foundations to which this 
‘yes’ applies. Similarly, Malta (only organisations enrolled as Voluntary 
Organisations), Netherlands (depends on size of turn over), and Sweden 
(‘yes’ only applies to larger foundations that conduct business and those 
set up by the state). In Denmark, commercial foundations are required to 
publish, whereas non-commercial foundations are not. 
Do annual acounts and/or activity reports 

























All the surveyed countries have a minimum level of 
supervision over foundations, however the form and 
extent of supervision varies greatly. Foundations are 
usually subject to supervision by the tax authority, and 
most countries have supervisory agencies with powers 
to inspect and intervene in management decisions in 
the case of mismanagement and dissolve a foundation 
in	specific	cases.	
3.5.1 SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY
External supervision of foundations established for 
public-benefit	purposes	is	generally	more	extensive	
than for private-purpose foundations62. In some 
countries	only	foundations	with	public-benefit	status	
are supervised63, while tax-exempt foundations are 
generally supervised by the tax authorities. 
While most countries will have a competent ministry 
entrusted with the supervision of foundations64, only 
two countries have supervisory bodies especially 
designated for foundations65. In some countries66, 
regional (as opposed to national) bodies undertake 
the supervision of foundations. Some countries have 
two different supervisory systems depending on 
the type of foundation67. Meanwhile in common law 
countries, public independent bodies which stand 
outside the hierarchy of public administration and 
have all necessary competence to supervise the 
sector68. 
Furthermore, courts and registration authorities play 
a supervisory role in many countries and have the 
ultimate power to dissolve a foundation or remove 
it from the registry. However, supervisory powers of 
courts are usually limited to actions upon initiation 
of an interested third party or the public prosecutor.
Only three countries69	 are	without	specific	 legal	or	
regulatory provisions to supervise foundations other 
than what is prescribed for any legal person70. 
3.5.2 EXTENT OF SUPERVISION
The legal and procedural powers granted to 
State supervisory bodies vary greatly across 
the 30 countries surveyed. For the most part, 
State supervisory bodies have the right to obtain 
information or to initiate inquiries. The board of a 
foundation must send annual reports and annual 
accounts to the relevant State supervisory authority 
as a means of preventive supervision. In some cases 
certain acts, governance decisions71, or documents 
must be approved by the relevant authority. 
In nine of the countries, only limited powers are given 
to the supervisory authorities72, such as courts acting 
upon requests from other stakeholders73 or public 
authorities with powers for receiving and reviewing 
annual reports. In Slovakia and Ukraine, supervisory 
authorities only have the power to make inquiries to 
foundations about the reports they submit. 
However, in other countries, the authorities have 
much greater powers to, among other things, 
undertake inspections on site74; intervene in case 




63 Usually by a special body (Bulgaria, Italy, and Malta) or the competent ministries (Romania and Ukraine).
64 Usually Ministry of Justice or Ministry of Interior; the Protectorates in Spain; the public prosecutor in Hungary and the Netherlands; or other State bodies such 
as the National Board of Patents and Registration in Finland or the Council of National Bequests in Greece.
65 Foundation authority under the Bundes-Sportförderungsgesetz (BSFG) in Austria; and the Directorate on Foundations in the Ministry of Interior in Turkey. 66 
Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland.
67 Austria for private and public foundations; Denmark for commercial and non-commercial foundations.
68 Charity Commission in the UK and Charities Regulatory Authority in Ireland.
69 Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania.
70 Supervision by the tax authority as a taxpayer organisation; by the social security and/or labour agency if they have employees; by state agencies that 
supervise public spending if they receive public funds, etc.
71 Amendment of statutes or liquidation.
72 Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, and Romania.
73 Tax authorities that investigate only in relation to fiscal matters.
74 Warranted inspections are permitted in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Sweden and unwarranted inspections in Austria, Poland, and Turkey. In France, public-benefit 
foundations are subject to inspection if they raise funds from the public and their donors claim tax benefits.
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Finally, supervisory authorities, or courts on 
the initiatives of such authorities may have the 
right to dissolve (and/or suspend, or transform) 
a foundation75. It should be noted that in some 
countries despite the legal powers vested in the 
supervisory authorities, supervision is not in practice 
as effective as might be expected, mainly due to lack 
of capacity of the supervisory authority76. 
3.6 COUNTER-TERRORISM 
3.6.1 LEGISLATION
Two thirds of the countries surveyed by this study 
have	 specific	 national	 anti-terrorism	 legislation,	
which brings with it further regulatory obligations 
for foundations. The EU Directive 2005/60/EC on 
the	 prevention	 of	 the	 use	 of	 the	 financial	 system	
for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist 
financing	 also	 has	 a	 regulatory	 impact.	 In	 eight	
countries, national anti-terrorism measures include 
requirements for foundations. For example in 
Bulgaria77, all NGOs are required to adopt internal 
regulations which are then submitted to the State 
Agency on National Security within four months of 
their establishment. There are further requirements78 
for	 all	 legal	 entities	 with	 regard	 to	 financial	
transactions. Since 2004, foundations in Poland are 
obliged	to	register	financial	transactions	carried	out	
on somebody else’s behalf or in somebody else’s 
name, in order to identify the person or organisations 
initiating the transaction, as well as the transaction’s 
beneficiaries.	
While	 there	 is	 no	 specific	 national	 anti-terrorism	
legislation in Switzerland, new regulations have been 
introduced79 on money laundering, which require that 
a	financial	 intermediary	starting	a	new	relationship	
with	 a	 foundation	 ask	 first	 for	 information	 about	
the founder, the authorised representative, and the 
categories	 of	 persons	 who	 may	 be	 beneficiaries,	
as well as the board members of the foundation. In 
France80	and	Belgium,	the	legislation	places	specific	
obligations on lawyers, notaries, and accountants/
auditors	 to	 alert	 the	 specified	 authorities	 of	
suspicious transactions by clients (among whom may 
be foundations). The supervisory role of the Charity 
Commission in the UK requires it to take steps to 
detect charities involved in terrorism, to intervene 
to protect against the misuse of charity assets e.g. 
through freezing orders and the suspension or 
removal of board members, and to refer suspicions 
of criminal activity to the police. 
3.6.2 GUIDANCE TOOLS AND CONSULTATIONS
Few	 specific	 guidance	 tools	 exist	 in	 the	 countries	
surveyed to support foundations’ compliance 
with their countries’ respective counter-terrorism 
measures. Exceptions are Poland81, which has 
an e-learning course on the regulations and 
requirements that eligible institutions must meet, 
and	 Austria	 where	 the	 fiscal	 authority	 offers	
guidance to foundations. Meanwhile, the UK Charity 
Commission has issued a guidance note entitled 
“Charity	 Commission	 Counter-terrorism	 Strategy”	
and is developing a series of compliance toolkits 
entitled	“Protecting	Charities	from	Harm”.	
Overall, there is a lack of consultation with the 
foundation sector regarding the issue of counter-
terrorism measures across Europe, with the exception 
of four countries.82
75 The court may dissolve a foundation in other countries as well but through a standard litigation procedure; whereas in these countries there is a special 
procedure envisioned in the legislation that is based on supervisory powers
76 Examples of weak enforcement in Cyprus, Hungary, Italy and Luxembourg have previously been reported to ECNL.
77 The Act on Measures Against Financing of Terrorism came into force in Bulgaria in 2003.
78 Under the Act on Measures Against Money Laundering.
79 By the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority. 
80 In France, lawyers, notaries and auditors advising clients in relation to the creation or management of endowment funds must make a declaration to a special 
committee on financial inquiry in cases where they suspect that the funds used may come from money laundering operations or may be linked to terrorist 
financing.
81 Developed by the Polish General Inspector of Financial Information at the Ministry of Finance.
82 Austria, Germany and the UK have all indicated that the relevant supervisory authority has engaged in consultation with the foundation sector. In Austria, 
this is an informal consultation process initiated by the fiscal authority. In the UK consultations on the government’s proposed strategy and the Charity 
Commission’s response to this were held in 2007 and 2008. In Poland, the sector (operating through NGO representatives in the Public Benefit Activity Council 
at the Ministry of Social Policy) is seeking to engage the Ministry of Finances in a discussion on the possibility of amending the law to exclude foundations 
and associations from the regulations in part, which impose on them the same obligations to which financial institutions (banks, credit institutions, insurance 




















Since the early 1990s, there has been a growing 
debate around and interest in developing codes 
of conduct, principles of good practice and self-
regulatory	frameworks	for	public-benefit	foundations.	
The impetus stems from the will of foundations to 
enhance their governance; forge a professional and 
efficient	sector;	support	the	sharing	of	good	practice	
and learning; maintain and strengthen trust in the 
sector; and to protect the political space in which they 
operate	 and	 develop	 clear	 and	 mutually–beneficial	
relationships	with	partners,	funders	and	beneficiaries.	
Self-regulation initiatives have therefore in most cases 
been developed independently from concerns about 
criminal	abuse	and	anti-terrorist	financing.	
For	 the	 purpose	 of	 mapping	 and	 analysis,	 a	 field	
study was undertaken among national associations of 
donors and foundations in European countries (mainly 
DAFNE members but also other national experts) to 
identify the principles of good practice, ethical codes, 
charters,	 quality	 marks	 and	 frameworks	 specifically	
targeting	public-benefit	foundations.	The	study	found	
that 15 associations of foundations have developed 
codes of practice or standards, which provide the key 
source for this study (See Annex I for the questionnaire 
and Annex II for the list of associations and their self-
regulatory mechanisms). Where applicable reference 
has also been made to additional self-regulation 
mechanisms. It should be noted that the study did not 
survey individual foundation practices, or policies and 
principles developed by individual foundations.
4.1 CODES OF CONDUCT
A total of 19 codes of conduct/ethical codes or 
principles	specific	or	directly	relevant	to	public-benefit	
foundations	were	identified.	Six83 of these are donors’ 
forum initiatives, while a further nine initiatives84 are 
from the national associations of foundations in the 
countries concerned. Four of the initiatives85were drawn 
up collaboratively by informal groups of foundations 
or	non-profit	organisations,	while	two	codes86 have an 
intrinsically international scope.
Looking at countries individually, a more complex 
picture emerges. In some cases, no national code 
exists	specific	to	public-benefit	foundations.	In	Italy,	the	
Association of Italian Foundations and Savings Banks 
(ACRI) provides guidelines for developing a code of 
ethics to its members, while the Latvian Community 
Foundation Movement has drafted standards of action 
and governance. In France, foundations can look to 
other foundations that publish their own individual 
codes,	 and/or	 apply	 for	 certification	 by	 external	
initiatives87. 
In Spain, several initiatives are afoot, including the 
Principles of the Spanish Association of Foundations 
(AEF) and accompanying materials, such as model 
foundation statutes that make recommendations 
beyond the legal requirements and documents offering 
guidance for individual foundations on establishing 
their own codes of conduct. Other initiatives include 
the codes of practice from the regional associations 
of foundations in Andalusia and Catalonia, the 
Code of Conduct of the Coordinating Committee of 
4. COMPARATIVE MAPPING OF  
 SELF-REGULATORY TOOLS
83 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Russia.
84 Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, UK, Spain and Switzerland. 
85 Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg, and Spain.
86 The EFC Principles of Good Practice (accompanied by the Illustrative Practice Options) and the EFC and Council on Foundations Principles of Accountability in 
International Philanthropy.
87 The Comite de la Charte du don en Confiance has defined an ethical and deontological charter which must be respected by organisations wishing to receive the 
label. IDEAS is a label given to the foundations or associations which respect the IDEAs Guide of Good Practices, covering three fields: governance, financial 
management, and efficiency of action. 
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Development Cooperation NGOs, and the Principles 
of Transparency and Best Practice project run by the 
Fundación Lealtad88. 
Germany also has a wide range of initiatives in place, 
including a Donation Seal89 and a Transparent Civil 
Society Initiative90 which has been adopted by the 
Association of German Foundations. In Poland, a 
sector-wide code of conduct for NGOs exists91, which 
encourages self-monitoring and adherence to the code 
on an on-going basis using an online evaluation tool.
For	several	countries	where	no	foundation	specific	self-
regulation mechanisms exist, the issue is nonetheless 
under discussion, and in some cases self-regulation 
mechanisms are currently being developed or are 
expected in the near future. In Ireland, the 2009 
Charities Act has not yet come fully into force but will 
see the creation of a new supervisory authority, the 
Charities Regulatory Authority, which will agree codes of 
practice for fundraising, operational and administrative 
aspects within the sector. In Turkey, the Third Sector 
Foundation of Turkey (TÜSEV) is currently preparing a 
set of principles of good practice92. Developments are 
also underway in Lithuania93.
4.2 METHOD OF CERTIFICATION
Most	 mechanisms	 are	 self-certified94, including 
instances where adherence to the self-regulation 
mechanism is a condition of membership/part of the 
membership declaration. However, there is generally 
no	active	monitoring	of	compliance	and	no	certification	
procedure as such. One exception is the Luxembourg 
Code de Bonne Conduit, which uses a combination 
of	 peer	 and	 third-party	 certification:	 Five	 out	 of	 six	
commitments	are	peer-reviewed,	whereas	the	financial	
transparency commitment is outsourced to an external 
auditor	who	certifies	the	annual	accounts	of	adhering	
organisations.
4.3 ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON  
PARTICIPATING ORGANISATIONS
Most of the national associations or donors’ forums 
surveyed publish information on their membership 
(e.g. list of members of the association appears on 
the association’s website). Members of the association 
can	therefore	be	clearly	identified	as	adherents	to	any	
code of conduct or set of standards with which the 
association requires its members to comply. 
4.4 SCOPE OF SELF-REGULATORY  
MECHANISMS
The self-regulatory mechanisms reviewed are largely 
internal and apply to members of the relevant 
donors’ forum or national association of foundations 
only95. However, a number of these organisations are 
ambitiously trying to go beyond their membership and 
open up their initiatives to the entire foundation sector 
of their respective countries, or even beyond.96 
In general, the self-regulatory mechanisms do not 
have any international or cross-border scope. And 
while no explicit reference is made to international 
activities within the mechanisms, it was noted by some 
respondents	to	the	field	study	that	these	activities	are	
implicit within the mechanism’s scope for foundations 
operating internationally.97 
Those with a clear international or cross-border outlook 
include Spain’s AEF Principles98; the Code of Ethics 
88 Fundación Lealtad developed nine standards of transparency and best practices as a result of consultations with many entities directly or indirectly related 
to the non-profit sector. The foundation has a team of analysts who examine the information provided by the foundation, conduct interviews, and visit NGOs. 
89 Known as the Spendensiegel, the seal is awarded by the German Central Institute for Social Issues (DZI). 
90 Established in 2010 the Initiative transparente Zivilgesellschaft has been adopted by Transparency International Germany e. V. and numerous partners from 
the non-profit sector (including the Association of German Foundations). 
91 The Charter of Principles for NGO Activities, prepared by the National Non-Governmental Initiatives Forum (Karta Zasad).
92 According to TÜSEV, the closest to a self-regulation mechanism presently in place is its online members’ database, an initiative of the foundation aiming to 
promote the transparency and visibility of the 120 foundations and associations that make up its members.
93 An NGO Commission has been established, which will work on this issue during the next two to three years. 
94 This the case for the codes analysed in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain 
(AEF Principles) and Russia, and with the EFC Principles of Good Practice. 
95 The following are non-binding: ACRI Code of Ethics, the AEF materials; 2007 Grant Risk Management Guidelines from the Association of Charitable 
Foundations (ACF); the SwissFoundations Code, The EFC/CoF Principles of Accountability in International Grantmaking. 
96 As is the case in Denmark, Germany, Slovakia, Spain, and Switzerland, and with the EFC Principles. 
97 Italy, Portugal, and Spain (AEF Principles and Fundación Lealtad).
98	The	principles	set	the	work	of	AEF	members	in	a	wider	context	of	national	and	international	collaboration	and	cooperation:	“…foundations	must	try	to	respond	





















of the Slovak Donors’ Forum and their Standards of 
Foundation Practice99; and the EFC Principles of Good 
Practice and the EFC/Council on Foundations Principles 
of Accountability in International Philanthropy.
4.5 GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT
Clear guidance on governance and management is 
given in 16 of the codes analysed.100
A number make recommendations or have 
requirements that go beyond the provisions of the 
respective national legislation. For instance, the self-
regulation code of the Network of Belgian Foundations 
requires that the composition of the foundation’s 
governing bodies is included in the annual report. 
The Council of Finnish Foundations’ Good Foundation 
Practice makes explicit the competency requirement 
of the foundation board101, while the Code of Conduct 
of the Association of Foundations in the Netherlands 
(FIN)	outlines	in	greater	detail	some	specific	tasks	and	
areas of responsibility for members of a foundation’s 
board102.
The Code of Ethics of the Slovak Donors Forum 
goes further and recommends continuous training 
for board members, which is not stipulated in the 
Slovak legislation. Training for board members is 
also suggested by the Swiss Foundation Code, which 
additionally provides guidance on a balanced board 
composition and appropriate orientation for new board 
members. On the role and responsibilities of trustees, 
the UK’s Association of Charitable Foundations’ 
Guidelines	 “Tackling	 external	 grant	 fraud:	 a	 guide	 to	
help charitable trusts and foundations deter and detect 
fraud”	 makes	 the	 practical	 suggestion	 to	 designate	
a particular trustee with responsibility for anti-fraud 
issues, something which goes beyond the legislation. 
A total of 13 codes103	contain	specific	rules	concerning	
human resources policies, while 19 codes104	specifically	
address conflict of interest policies. It should be noted 
that	 five	 of	 these	 codes105 have been developed in 
countries where there are no legal requirements 
regarding conflict of interest.
4.6 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
A total of 20106 of the codes clearly recall the legal 
obligation that foundations have with regard to 
reporting requirements and/or outline further 
recommendations for good reporting. Out of 
these, the codes in 11 countries107 make additional 
recommendations going beyond the legal 
requirements. For instance, the Slovak Donors Forum 
asks that foundations prepare an annual social impact 
report, submit a list of awarded grants to the forum, 
and publish an annual report online108. Similarly in Italy, 
foundations are encouraged to report to stakeholders 
on the social impact of their activities and to make 
reports available on their websites. Some foundations 
also increasingly seek an external audit of their 
accounts. In Spain, the AEF Principles recommend that 
foundations, among other things, open up their facilities 
and projects to the community; create and maintain 
active and accessible lines of communication with 
the media; and prepare reports or other informative 
documents about their activities. The AEF Principles 
also recommend that foundations participate in 
evaluations carried out by prestigious institutions, and 
undergo regular audits109.
99	“For	grants	awarded	outside	Slovakia,	the	foundation	takes	appropriate	steps	to	control	the	use	of	funds”.	
100 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain – within the code of ethics of the Catalonian 
Association of Foundations, Fundación Lealtad, and AEF Principles, UK, Switzerland, and the EFC Principles of Good Practice. 
101	“The	administration	of	members	of	the	Council	shall	include	the	expertise	required	for	operations	and	for	asset	management.”
102 For example, the board, among other tasks, implements policy related to the granting of donations and other forms of support; determines the procedure of 
handling and completing donation requests; creates a plan for the resignation and/or re-appointing of board members; draws up criteria for the evaluation of 
projects; and provides a description of the administrative organisation and the method of internal control. 
103 Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain (all initiatives reviewed).
104 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain (all initiatives reviewed), Russia, 
Switzerland, and the EFC Principles of Good Practice.
105 Bulgaria, Romania, Netherlands, Slovakia, and Switzerland.
106 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain (AEF 
Principles, Coordinating Committee of Catalonian Foundations, Fundación Lealtad, and Coordinating Committee of Development Cooperation NGOs) Russia, 
and Switzerland.
107 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain (AEF Principles) and Russia.
108 Foundations are encouraged to distribute an electronic version of their annual reports to their stakeholders. 
109 Under Spanish law external audit is required only for larger foundations.
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4.7 MONITORING THE USE OF FUNDS 
A total of 19 codes110 give guidance pertaining to 
the	 use	 of	 funds,	 with	 many	 addressing	 fiduciary	
principles, funds spent on overhead costs111, and 
“know	 your	 beneficiary”	 rules	 or	 additional	 control	
mechanisms. For instance, The Council of Finnish 
Foundations recommends that the regular distribution 
of grants within a framework of clear procedures; that 
foundations’ governing bodies include experts; and 
that the board has guidelines on assets management. 
Similarly, in the Netherlands, FIN members are 
encouraged to formulate a policy on asset management 
and investment, and are given guidance on how such a 
policy could be constituted. In Portugal and Germany112, 
general recommendations are provided on the regular 
monitoring of the foundations’ work and procedures, 
as	well	as	the	use	of	financial	resources	(particularly	
levels of administrative expenses) and investment 
strategies.113 
Many of the codes114 make references to foundations’ 
commitments towards donors and towards the 
public, and to the monitoring of the use of funds. 
In Denmark115, foundations are asked to regularly 
evaluate their grantmaking work in relation to their 
statutes and strategy to ensure that goals are met, 
while in Italy foundations are encouraged to develop 
rules	 governing	 the	 relationship	 with	 beneficiaries,	
and	 the	 selection,	 financing	 and	 careful	 monitoring	
of projects. Foundations in the UK116 are also 
provided	with	guidance	regarding	how	to	“know	your	
beneficiary”	 and	 verify	 the	 identity	 of	 individuals	
seeking funding. In Slovakia, foundations adhering to 
the Standards of Foundation Practice are expected to 
conduct a survey in order to verify that the money has 
actually	been	spent	for	the	public-benefit	purpose.	
4.8 ACCOUNTABILITY TOWARDS  
BENEFICIARIES
A total of 13 codes surveyed address transparency and 
accountability	towards	grantees/beneficiaries117.
In three of the codes118, it is recommended that 
foundations	 involve	 grantees/beneficiaries	 in	
programme design/evaluation. In the case of Slovakia, 
foundations are encouraged to invite grantees and 
other stakeholders to share the lessons learned in the 
board/staff meetings, retreats or learning exchanges.
By its nature, the focus of the EFC/CoF Principles 
of Accountability in International Philanthropy is 
very much concerned with the conduct of funders 
operating abroad and the responsibilities of these 
organisations when operating in this way: this includes 




by foundations. In the case of Spain, the AEF Principles 
state that when necessary, foundations should also 
endeavour to fundraise and attract third parties in 
order	 to	 finance	 their	 activities.120 Other codes exist 
which	 focus	specifically	on	 fundraising	organisations121, 
however these have not been examined in depth by this 
study.
4.10 COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS
Responses related to six122 codes indicated that 
compliance with the code by adhering organisations 
is actively monitored. In both the Czech Republic and 
Poland, the donors forum itself carries out checks 
on participating organisations’ annual reports as a 
110 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain (all initiatives discussed), UK, and Russia, and 
the EFC Principles of Good Practice and the EFC/CoF Principles of Accountability in International Philanthropy.
111 The Russia Donors’ Forum states that members agree to to strive to keep administrative costs to a minimum.
112 Portuguese Foundation Center and the Association of German Foundations.
113 Both these sets of principles also include recommendations on monitoring and evaluation of foundations’ programmes.
114 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Spain (all initiatives), Russia and the EFC Principles of Good Practice.
115 Danish Principles of Good Practice for Charitable Foundations.
116 UK Association of Charitable Foundations’ 2007 Guidelines.
117 Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain (Andalusian Association of Foundations and Coordinating Committee of Catalonian 
Foundations), UK, and Russia, EFC Principles of Good Practice (and the Illustrative Practice Options), and the EFC/CoF Principles of Accountability in 
International Philanthropy.
118 Poland and Slovakia, and the EFC/CoF Principles of Accountability in International Philanthropy.
119 The code of the Slovak Donors Forum and Spain’s AEF Principles.
120 Principle 6: Balance and efficiency in management of resources.
121 For example: France (Comité de la Charte du Don en Confiance), Germany (Central Institute for Social Issues (DZI)), Ireland (Irish Charities’ Tax Reform 
Group’s Guiding Principles for Fundraising), Luxembourg (Code de bonne conduite des organismes faisant appel à la générosité du public), Spain (Code 
of Conduct of the Coordinating Committee of Development Cooperation NGOs), UK (among others the voluntary code for members of the Institute of 
Fundraising).




















means of reviewing compliance with the codes, while 
in Slovakia the Standards of Foundation Practice of the 
Slovak Donors Forum, has its own internet monitoring 
system of its members’ use of the Standards. 
All organisations signing up to the Principles of 
Transparency and Best Practice project of the 
Fundación Lealtad in Spain agree to be monitored123 by 
a third party, with the results published in the guide 
Guía de la Transparencia y las buenas prácticas de 
las ONG. Application of the Irish Charities Tax Reform 
Group’s Guiding Principles for Fundraising is monitored 
by a monitoring group, which takes appropriate action 
in case of non-compliance. 
Responses related to 12 codes124 indicated that non-
compliance with the self-regulatory initiative can 
incur sanctions, with most mentioning exclusion from 
the relevant association/donors forum or project as a 
possible sanction. Only one DAFNE member reported 
having excluded a member for non-compliance with 
the self-regulatory mechanism. In Spain, compliance 
with the Code of Conduct of the Coordinating 
Committee of Development Cooperation NGOs (ONGD) 
is overseen by a Monitoring Committee, who may 
propose sanctions for review by the governing body of 
the organisation concerned. 
4.11  PROMOTION
The internet is used as the main forum for promotion of the 
self-regulatory mechanisms or codes, with organisations 
announcing their adherence to the relevant codes via 
their own websites. In eight countries125, organisations 
are also encouraged to announce their adherence to the 
code in their annual report.
A total of four national associations/donors forums126 
indicated that they regularly organise events to 
promote their self-regulatory mechanisms. For 
instance, in Denmark, the foundations that initiated 
the Danish Principles of Good Practice for Charitable 
Foundations meet twice yearly. In addition these 
Danish foundations have held three symposia open to 
all foundations in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
The Swiss Foundation Code is regularly mentioned in 
articles published and speeches given by the initiating 
body SwissFoundations. The code has also been 
published in hard copy and is available in bookshops. 
In contrast to the general trend of promoting their 
codes and standards, in the UK the 2007 Grant 
Risk Management Guidelines are restricted to ACF 
members only. However, the guidelines ask users for 
feedback and for further examples of controls being 
used by organisations, as well as for information on 
cases of external grant fraud. 
4.12 IMPACT
4.12.1 FOUNDATIONS’ VIEWS ON INCREASED DEMAND 
FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Respondents in 9 of the countries127 surveyed 
noted that foundations have reacted positively 
to an increased demand for transparency and 
accountability and where applicable the development 
of self-regulatory mechanisms. The general feeling is 
that these codes answer calls from government for 
increased transparency and accountability, and that 
they also enhance levels of trust and foundations’ 
credibility among their stakeholders and society. 
It should be noted that the responses from most 
countries indicated that no evidence had been 
found to suggest that grants have been or are being 
misused	 by	 beneficiaries	 for	 criminal	 purposes.	
For example, the response from the Association of 
German Foundations noted that while such misuse 
may occur, they had not themselves come across 
or	been	made	aware	of	any	specific	cases.	Only	the	
responses from Bulgaria and the UK mentioned 
examples of misuse in their respective countries.
In Slovakia, all members of the Slovak Donors Forum 
have been through a self-assessment process128 
and their overall evaluation of the usefulness of 
123 The group examines information provided by the foundation, conducts interviews, and visits the organisations.
124 Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain (AEF Principles and Coordinating Committee of Development 
Cooperation NGOs), and the EFC Principles of Good Practice.
125 Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Switzerland.
126 Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland.
127 Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain (AEF), Switzerland, and Turkey.
128 Standards of Foundation Practice self-assessment tool.
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the Forum’s Standards as a management tool was 
very positive. In Switzerland, foundations do not, 
in general, perceive any increased demand for 
transparency and it is felt that levels of public (and 
government) trust in the sector are high. Foundations 
consider membership of the SwissFoundations 
association as a positive label that not only gives 
added security, but also offers the chance to belong 
to a group of progressive and innovative players 
within the sector.
On the whole, disclosure of information for use in 
databases and reports has not been problematic; 
although a minority of foundations in Turkey (10 out 
of 120 TÜSEV members) were hesitant in supplying 
financial	 information	 for	 inclusion	 in	 and	 public	
availability via the TÜSEV membership database. 
In Poland, some foundations found that disclosure 
increased their administrative burden. It was 
reported that in Demark, progress in getting more 
foundations to adhere to the established principles 
has	been	slow,	making	it	difficult	to	accurately	assess	
their impact.
4.12.2 EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEW OF SELF-
REGULATORY MECHANISMS 
Respondents from a total of 7 countries129 reported 
that self-regulatory mechanisms are perceived 
positively by external stakeholders and are seen 
as helping to increase public trust in the sector. In 
Poland, it was noted that a debate on regulation only 
tends to take place when there is a particular problem 
in relation to the sector or the actions/activities 
of	 specific	 organisations.	 It	 was	 reported	 that	 in	
Finland, the self-regulation mechanism had proved 
useful in countering negative views during recent 
public incidents involving foundations. Meanwhile, 
responses from several countries pointed to the lack 
of monitoring and compliance mechanisms and the 
possible need for these, in order for self-regulation 
initiatives to gain more credibility in the eyes of 
external stakeholders. Two responses130 reported 
lack of interest/awareness by external stakeholders.
4.12.3 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF SELF-
REGULATORY MECHANISMS AND AN OPEN POLICY
Most responses reported positive effects as a result 
of having greater transparency and several countries 
outlined the usefulness of the self-regulatory tool 
during discussions with the media and governments. 
In the Czech Republic, an open policy has led to an 
increase in the number of articles published in the 
media concerning philanthropy and foundations’ 
activities. Responses from six countries131 reported that 
the increase in self-regulatory initiatives or soft law 
approaches	 has	 been	 very	 beneficial,	
leading	 to	 foundations	 having	 identifiably	
amended their practices for the better. In 
Luxembourg, the self-regulatory initiative has, for 
certain foundations, resulted in one or more of the 
following: a clearer separation of functions (between 
directors and managers) in foundations; a better 
tracking of foundations’ accounting systems for 
restricted and designated donations; and the hiring 
of external auditors to certify annual accounts. In 
Switzerland, many boards checked their principles 
and processes on the basis of the Swiss Foundation 
Code and implemented new regulations. Although 
impact assessment has not been conducted on 
many of these self-regulatory initiatives, two of 
those surveyed132 did feel that their introduction 
has certainly raised the issue of transparency and 
accountability on the agendas of most foundations.
There are some potentially negative impacts, such as 
the possibility of an increased bureaucratic burden 
on foundations, as mentioned in the response 
from Poland, and an increase in unsolicited grants 
proposals. However, negatives have sometimes 
been transformed into positives, as in the case of 
Switzerland. There, SwissFoundations publishes a 
list of its members including their addresses and a 
short description of each organisation’s purpose. 
This has prompted organisations to communicate 
more clearly what they do and do not support – most 
SwissFoundations members now outline their grant 
criteria on their website.
129 Estonia, Finland, Poland, Portugal, Spain (AEF), Switzerland, and Turkey.
130 Luxembourg, and UK.
131 Finland, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.





















As we have seen from both mappings (Sections 3 and 
4), transparency and accountability elements can be 
found in the different parts of the regulatory and self-
regulatory frameworks that govern a foundation’s life, 
from the process of establishment, in later operations 
and in relation to its different stakeholders. 
This section provides an analysis of the transparency 
and accountability elements that inform stakeholders 
about foundations gaining, maintaining, and, in some 
cases losing a specific status, within foundation law, 
charity law/public-benefit legislation and tax law or 
self-regulation, as outlined in the matrix below.
5. ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN
 (SELF-) REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Based on the matrix, the comparative analysis uses 
the following breakdown of the information disclosed 
during the lifetime of a foundation: 
a) Information about gaining a specific status and how 
this information is submitted 
b) To whom are foundations accountable at each 
stage? 
c) Content of the information shared with relevant 
stakeholders at each stage 
d) Tools of enforcement when information is not 
submitted, or misuse/illegal actions have occurred 
5.1. FOUNDATION LAW AND FOUNDATION  
TAX LAW
5.1.1 ESTABLISHMENT/GAINING A SPECIFIC STATUS
a) Gaining a specific status and how the information 
is submitted 
An act involving a public authority (registration and/
or approval) is needed for a foundation to obtain 
legal personality. This formation act is made publicly 
available in all surveyed countries either through a 
public register or access to the founding act. 
FOUNDATION 
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In some cases the establishment of a foundation 
may automatically lead to tax exemption, although in 
most surveyed countries an additional registration/
approval with fiscal authorities is needed to obtain 
a tax-exempt status. The information submitted is 
normally not accessible to the public but is kept with 
the fiscal authorities. In some countries foundations 
can obtain a special public-benefit status, which is a 
prerequisite for tax exemption but not dealt with in 
tax law (e.g. the UK and Irish charity status, Italian 
ONLUS status, and similarly in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Malta, Poland, Portugal and Romania). 
b) To whom are foundations accountable? 
During the phase of establishment and beyond, 
public-benefit foundations are accountable to the 
supervisory/registration authority and the general 
public, which engages with the foundation as a legal 
entity. The registration authority/court registers the 
foundation if legal requirements are fulfilled. Where 
additional approval/registration is required for tax 
exemption (e.g. gaining a public-benefit status), the 
foundation is accountable to the tax authorities and 
– where applicable – the public-benefit registration 
authority, and indirectly to the public at large. 
c) Content of the information
It is implicit in the national legislations covered 
in the study that the registration authority/court 
checks if the legal requirements are fulfilled.133 In 
case of a special public-benefit status, this would 
only be granted if legal requirements are met. 
The tax authorities only approve eligibility for tax 
exemptions if sufficient documentation is provided 
showing that the tax law requirements are met. 
Both the legal and tax law requirements are defined 
by the respective national laws, but the mapping 
showed that they include, in general, the following 
elements: pursuance of a public-benefit purpose; 
assets; organisational structure; intention to use 
assets for public-benefit purpose (non-distribution 
constraint; no assets revert back to private 
ownership; administration costs/remuneration costs 
within certain limits); scope of activities (limitation on 
fundraising/economic activities where appropriate); 
and additional criteria related to gaining a public-
benefit status.
d) Tools of enforcement 
The supervisory/registration authority in most 
countries may simply refuse to approve/register a 
foundation if requirements are not fulfilled.134 The 
general public has no enforcement rights but may, 
for example, inform the supervisory authority about 
certain circumstances and may inform the police/
state attorney in case of criminal acts.135 Where 
applicable, the authority would not grant a public-
benefit status if the legal requirements are not met. 
Where applicable (because tax-exempt status is not 
automatic), the fiscal authorities do not grant a tax-
exempt status to those organisations that do not 
provide sufficient documentation to show that the 
public-benefit status requirements are met. 
5.1.2 MAINTAINING A STATUS 
a) Maintaining a specific status and how the 
information is submitted 
During the lifetime of a foundation, it is checked 
whether the requirements for its status (legal 
personality, public-benefit status, tax-exempt status) 
are continuously met. Annual reports are generally 
submitted to the supervisory authority and an 
auditor reviews the financial report, where legally 
required. In most cases, annual reports are also 
made publicly available.
133 In case of a special public-benefit status, this would only be granted if legal requirements are met.
134 When some requirements are missing in the registration application, the registration authority will first typically call the foundation to complete its application. 
Refusal would usually happen only after the failure of the foundation to submit supplemental documentation.




















Most countries require that changes to the 
foundation’s key data are updated in the register, 
which is publicly available in most cases. Tax 
authorities review annual financial and activity 
reports, as well as the tax declaration of the 
foundation in most cases.
b) To whom are foundations accountable? 
Public-benefit foundations are accountable during 
their lifetime to various stakeholders, namely 
supervisory authorities, tax authorities, auditors, 
and the general public (directly and/or indirectly via 
the supervisory/tax authority). The general public 
has access to the registers in those 24 countries 
with a publicly-available register and to annual 
reports where they are made publicly available. 
Fiscal authorities also review the tax declarations of 
foundations where appropriate.  
c) Content of the information
It is implicit in the national legislation across the 
30 countries surveyed that the above-mentioned 
stakeholders check/review the relevant information 
as follows: 
•	Supervisory authorities review annual financial 
statements and annual activity reports. 
•	 Supervisory and/or fiscal authorities monitor 
whether foundations fulfil legal requirements and 
pursue their public-benefit purpose.136 Promotion of 
efficiency in operations and pursuit of public-benefit 
purpose, such as limitation on administration costs 
of foundations, is provided for in a few foundation 
and/or foundation tax laws. 
•	Supervisory authorities also monitor whether 
governance requirements are lawfully implemented 
and reporting/auditing is properly undertaken 
where required.
•	Auditors undertake the audit, where legally 
required. 
•	Fiscal authorities review the tax declarations of 
foundations.  
•	The general public has access to the registers 
in those 24 countries with a publicly available 
register and to annual reports, where they are 
made publicly available. 
d) Tools of enforcement? 
The tools vary according to the authorities carrying 
out the enforcement. In most countries, the 
supervisory authority may have the power to:
•	Ensure required documents are delivered
•	Make inquiries upon review of reports
•	Undertake inspections 
•	Object to board decisions and intervene in case of 
mismanagement 
•	Dismiss board members
•	Approve/disapprove decisions on certain issues 
(amendment of statutes/liquidation rules; 
remuneration of board members; contracts in case 
of conflict of interest)
•	 Initiate withdrawal of the public-benefit status 
•	 Initiate dissolution of the foundation
Fiscal authorities can request more information or a 
closer review of the foundation’s activities, and start 
the process of withdrawing a foundation’s special tax-
exempt status. They can also require the foundation 
to pay back received advantages. The auditor may 
comment in the auditor’s report, where appropriate. 
The general public has no enforcement rights but 
may, for example, inform the supervisory authority 
about certain circumstances, and may inform the 
police/state attorney in case of criminal acts. 
136 Non-distribution constraint; no assets revert back to private ownership; administration costs are reasonable, duty of loyalty and duty of care are observed 
etc.
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5.1.3 LOSS OF A STATUS 
a) Loss of a specific status and how the information 
is submitted
The public-benefit status is withdrawn. The tax-
exempt status is withdrawn. The foundation is 
dissolved through the withdrawal of the legal 
personality removal from the register.
b) To whom are foundations accountable? 
At the moment of dissolution, public-benefit 
foundations are accountable to the supervisory 
authority and the general public. In case of loss of 
public-benefit or tax-exempt status, the general 
public is either informed through a register or through 
obtaining the information via the organisation itself. 
c) Content of information
The foundation no longer has public-benefit/tax-
exempt status. In case of dissolution, the public-
benefit foundation as a legal entity no longer 
exists. In some countries the fact of a foundation’s 
dissolution is itself recorded in the relevant register; 
in others the dissolved foundation is simply removed 
from the register.
d) What are tools of enforcement? 
In most countries, the supervisory authority is 
involved, and may even be an initiator, in the 
dissolution process of foundations. According to 
most of the reviewed legislations, dissolution is the 
last resort of supervisory authorities (and may take 
place against the will of a foundation’s governing 
bodies) in the case where assets no longer exist 
or the purpose of a foundation can no longer be 
pursued. In case of loss of public-benefit/tax-exempt 
status, it is the supervisory or tax authority that can 
withdraw the status against the will of the governing 
organ of the foundation. 
5.2 COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF SELF-
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The study focused on self-regulatory mechanisms or 
codes of conduct developed by national foundation 
networks specifically for foundations.137 
a) Type of information and how it is submitted
The type of information provided differs according 
to individual self-regulatory mechanisms even 
within one country. The foundation codes imply 
a declaration of intent, whereas some specific 
mechanisms imply a certification or seal of approval. 
In many countries, national networks or associations 
of foundations make basic data about their members 
publicly available. All the self-regulatory mechanisms 
considered by the study require foundations to 
publish their annual reports, in many cases with 
involvement of an auditor. Some codes require 
foundations to report on their social impact.
b) To whom are foundations accountable? 
Self-regulatory mechanisms address foundations' 
transparency and accoutability to various 
stakeholders: the general public as well as 
partners, donors, and beneficiaries. Through these 
mechanisms, foundations are also transparent and 
accountable to each other, asserting to one another 
that they all undertake the same high level of 
transparency and accountability in their operations. 
The public at large is, in most countries, informed 
about the participation of a foundation in the self-
regulatory mechanism either by the foundation 
itself (often via the foundation’s website) or by the 
137 Only a side reference was made to codes/certification systems developed for fundraising organisations or NPOs in general. In addition, it should be noted that 




















organisation issuing the self-regulatory mechanism 
(often also via a website/list). 
c) Content of information
Adhering to a self-regulatory mechanism may imply 
different requirements, according to the various self-
regulatory mechanisms: 
•	Pursuit of public-benefit purpose/use of funds
•	Governance and management requirements 
•	Reporting and publicity requirements (publication 
of annual financial and activity reports) 
•	Accountability towards donors and beneficiaries 
and involvement of beneficiaries 
d) What are the tools of enforcement? 
Where applicable, the organisation issuing a 
certification will only do so if the requirements are met. 
The organisation that designed the self-regulatory 
mechanism may request that the foundation should 
fulfil certain requirements if the foundation has not 
already met the requirements of its own accord. The 
organisation issuing a certification will withdraw 
the certification/declaration of intent or initiate 
membership exclusion, where appropriate.
The self-regulatory mechanisms developed by DAFNE 
members or by informal groups of foundations 
generally do not imply a certification system, but 
the voluntary subscription to agreed principles. If 
a foundation does not adhere to the principles, the 
organisation issuing the principles may, according to 
all the self-regulation mechanisms reviewed by this 
study, ask the foundation to comply or explain. Non-
compliance may result in exclusion from membership 
or the initiative. However, only one DAFNE member 
reported having excluded a member for this reason. 
A total of six countries reported that adherence to 
the self-regulatory mechanism by organisations that 
have signed up to it is actively monitored.
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6.1 WHAT LEVEL OF REGULATION IS  
APPROPRIATE? 
From a broader policy perspective, it is important to 
emphasise that government regulation is essential 
not merely to enhance foundation accountability, but 
to create an enabling environment for foundations to 
flourish,	 to	create	a	 level-playing	field	 for	 the	sector,	
and to balance the interests of the sector in relation 
to other segments of society. Ideally, therefore, 
legal frameworks should provide clear and simple 
provisions which underpin foundations’ capacity to 
operate	 efficiently	 and	 fulfil	 their	 objectives,	 while	
providing	sufficient	guarantees	 to	 the	public	of	 their	
transparency and accountability. 
Developing a fair and flexible regulatory framework 
is challenging, since there is no blueprint as such: 
countries are very different in terms of their historical, 
cultural, social, political and legal contexts and this 
results in a range of legislative and policy solutions 
to tackle the same issues in the different national 
contexts.
For example, depending on the country’s tradition of 
how foundations developed and what role they play in 
social development, one country may require a high 
starting capital from a foundation138, while another139 
may require no property at all at the registration of 
the foundation, but both are legitimate approaches. 
When a country with no recent tradition of the 
foundation form introduces a requirement for starting 
capital140, it can be seen as hindering the development 
of the foundations by erecting a barrier that many 
potential	 initiatives	cannot	fulfil,	or	 it	can	be	seen	as	
a strategic effort to ensure longer-term sustainability 
of foundations and the civil society organisations they 
support. To take another example, in a country with 
a	“rule	of	law”	culture	and	a	customary	tendency	for	
transparency, prescribing in detail the information that 
should be included in an annual report may be seen as 
unnecessary bureaucracy, whereas in a country with a 
tradition of undertaking only what is prescribed, it may 
be a necessary tool to ensure minimum transparency. 
Therefore, regulation has to be evaluated within its 
proper historical and national context, and the impact 
it is expected to have must also be considered. 
Regulatory frameworks should take into account 
the principle of proportionality. Legal requirements 
should be in proportion to the size and capacity of 
the foundation to which they apply. Furthermore, 
the foundation sector itself is highly diverse. This 
diversity also means that a number of issues are best 
regulated by the foundations themselves; otherwise 
arbitrary solutions may be imposed without regard 
to the organisational context.141 Misplaced regulation 
can, for example, place pressure for higher pay-outs, 
leading	 to	 investment	 policies	with	 risk	 profiles	 that	
boards are not prepared for, and that could erode 
elements of foundations’ autonomy. Heavy regulation 
can have unintended side effects, such as damaging 
entrepreneurship in foundations. It may, for instance, 
result in risk aversion, preference for larger NGOs as 
beneficiaries,	 or	 preference	 for	 domestic	 instead	 of	
international	 activities.	 Compliance	 with	 fiduciary	
responsibilities and legal requirements, therefore, 




140 Like the Czech Republic in 1998.
141 For example, practices ensuring accountability in operations and governance.






















However, there needs to be a minimum level of 
accountability ensured: regulation needs to seek a 
balance between the autonomy of the foundation and 
the public interest in ensuring that funds are spent 
according	to	the	public-benefit	purposes.	
An important principle to take into consideration is 
consultation and more broadly, a participatory process 
for the development of regulatory frameworks. The 
success of such initiatives depends to a large extent 
on the involvement of the sector to which they will 
apply in developing them. The most successful public 
regulatory initiatives rely on consultation with – and in 
some cases joint design by – the relevant sector.
6.2 NO NEED FOR EUROPEAN REGULATION ON  
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
With this in mind, it is important to recognise that there 
cannot	be	any	“one	size	fits	all”	regulation	that	could	be	
universally applied in Europe.  At the same time, there 
are principles related to transparency and accountability, 
such	as	those	spelled	out	above,	that	can	be	identified	
and that governments and foundations themselves can 
and	 should	 translate	 into	 context-specific	 regulatory	
and self-regulatory frameworks and provisions. 
The	mapping	showed	that	there	is	no	need	for	specific	
legislation/legal standards or a general code of 
conduct/voluntary guidelines regarding transparency 
and accountability of foundations at EU level. 
Transparency and accountability requirements for 
public-benefit	 foundations	 are	 well	 addressed	 in	 the	
various national and regional laws of the 27 Member 
States. However, based on different legal traditions, 
accountability and transparency are achieved in a 
number of ways and through different mechanisms and 
concepts. In many countries the existing combination 
of self-regulation and binding rules form a very 
effective scenario with regard to transparency and 
accountability. Often transparency and accountability 
requirements are part of the state supervision and/or 
tax regulation, which have a long-standing tradition in 
the respective environments and cultures. Hence there 
is no single model/solution to uphold transparency and 
accountability and harmonisation is neither possible 
nor a desired measure.142  
Having said that, the transparency and accountability 
requirements drafted for a European Foundation 
Statute (as a supranational legal form) could serve 
as a benchmark of accountability, transparency 
and good governance across the EU and beyond.143 
The supranational legal form would also bring 
much-needed clarity to both the use of the term 
“foundation”,	 the	 precise	 meaning	 of	 which	 varies	
from country to country and may refer to very 
diverse	 undertakings,	 ranging	 from	 personal	 benefit	
to commercial endeavours; as well as providing 
a	 common	 definition	 for	 Europe	 of	 public-benefit	
purpose. The European Commission has committed to 
putting forward a proposal on a European Foundation 
Statute by the end of 2011.144 An impact assessment is 
underway and while the details of the Commission’s 
proposal are yet to be announced, several proposals 
for the regulation have already been published, namely 
the EFC’s Proposal for a Regulation on a European 
Statute for Foundations (2005)145 and The European 
Foundation: A New Legal Approach, an initiative of the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung.146 Both proposals address key 
questions on the registration, internal governance, and 
supervision of the European Foundation. Concerning 
the transparency and accountability of the European 
Foundation (requirements regarding reporting, 
auditing, and the publication of such information), 
both the EFC and the Bertelsmann Stiftung project 
proposals require the European Foundation to produce 
an annual report describing the foundation’s activities 
in	 pursuit	 of	 its	 public-benefit	 purpose	 and	 annual	
142 A good overview of the current state of the debate on European regulation transparency and accountability of public-benefit organisations can be found 
in Oonagh B. Breen, Through the Looking Glass: European Perspectives on Non-profit Vulnerability, Legitimacy and Regulation, Brooklyn International Law 
Journal, Volume 36, Issue 3, 2011, pages 947 - 991.
143 In 2007 the European Commission launched the process for a Feasibility Study on a European Foundation Statute, which was prepared during 2008 by 
experts from the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg and the Centre for Social Investment at the University of 
Heidelberg. It can be downloaded at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/eufoundation/index_en.htm
144 See European Commission communications Towards a Single Market Act - For a highly competitve social economy 27.10.2010 COM (2010) 608 final and Single 
Market Act – Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen confidence, 13.04.2011 COM (2011) 206 final
145 Available at www.efc.be
146 http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/bst/en/media/xcms_bst_dms_15347__2.pdf
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accounts. In both cases the requirement for external 
auditing is reserved for foundations operating above a 
certain	financial	threshold.
In this context, it seems clear that the current role 
of	 the	 EU	 should	 be	 a	 “facilitator”	 and	 potentially	 a	
“qualifier”	 but	 not	 a	 “regulator”	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
the	transparency	and	accountability	of	public-benefit	
foundations. The EU could take a more proactive role 
in assisting ongoing national processes by helping to 
inform stakeholders and share good practices from 
across the Member States. It would be worthwhile 
examining whether the EU could provide a platform 
for exchange of best practices among Member States. 
This could take several forms and also include a forum 
for dialogue, in order to promote accountability and 
transparency and serve as an ongoing resource for 
information and exchange. Underlying this is the need 
for solutions to be designed through consultation with 
the sector as a whole to ensure that the initiatives are 
as rich and complete as possible.
6. 3. ARE THERE FUNDAMENTAL GAPS 
IN EXISTING (SELF-) REGULATION ON 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY? 
The mapping of the regulatory and self-regulatory 
frameworks across the European countries shows no 
fundamental gaps, and corresponds to the rationale 
behind transparency and accountability regulation as 
follows: 
6.3.1 CREDITOR PROTECTION
National legislators have developed individual 
instruments to ensure creditor protection. The 
granting of legal personality will normally protect 
the capital of the foundation from creditors of the 
founders/donors. The establishment procedure for 
foundations generally involves a public authority/
court, which checks whether the foundation 
fulfils the requirements to gain legal personality. 
Foundations are required to present their basic 
data in a public register as a means to ensure that 
credible information is provided to all parties with 
whom the organisation enters into contracts. As 
shown in the study, virtually all European countries 
require that foundations prepare and submit their 
annual accounts to a relevant authority. It should 
be noted that in some countries more substantial 
economic activities and/or fundraising activities may 
be subject to stricter or additional controls to ensure 
legal security and creditor protection. 
6.3.2 MECHANISMS TO PREVENT MISMANAGEMENT 
AND ABUSE 
Foundations are autonomous from the state but 
at	 the	 same	 time	 they	 do	 not	 have	 a	 “built-in”	
mechanism to control against abuse within their 
governance structure: they generally have no owners 
or shareholders who would have a vested interest - 
direct incentives - to protect the organisation. The 
issue becomes relevant as soon as the foundation 
is set up. During the process of establishment, no 
control issue exists because the founder has the 
free choice to either set up a foundation or not. It 
is only after the foundation is formed that the will 
of the founder needs further support/protection. 
The	 “good	 governance”	 of	 a	 foundation	 depends	
significantly on the ethical standing of its board, so 
the foundation can be seen as more vulnerable to 
mismanagement than other types of legal entities. 
However, the analysis has shown that existing 
regulation (a combination of transparency and 
accountability regulation and external supervisory 
structures) provides for a solid system of control 
over foundations and their governing bodies, which 
takes the specific governance structure into account. 
The duty of care and the duty of loyalty of board 
members are recognised in all surveyed countries 
and are part of the respective legal provisions. 
The duty of loyalty is expressed by the reviewed 




















147 In a number of countries, requirements for tax exemption are outlined in civil law (public-benefit legislation); while in the UK and Ireland there is charity law.
of interest rules, non-distribution constraint and 
limitation, or even prevention, of remuneration of 
board members. The duty of loyalty is intended to 
act as a counterbalance to the natural self-interest of 
board members. The duty of care implies that board 
members must diligently apply their own skills for 
the proper management of the foundation. This duty 
is implemented by national legislation in different 
ways, generally through rules that ensure that the 
will of the founder needs to be taken into account 
when changing statutes. Members of the boards are 
in most countries personally liable in cases of losses 
caused by (at least) grossly negligent acts or wilful 
defaults on their part (breach of duty). The liability 
of board members aims to ensure board members’ 
duties of care and loyalty, in particular proper 
management of the foundations’ activities and 
assets	and	pursuance	of	the	public-benefit	purpose.	
It therefore appears that national foundation laws 
provide for a regulatory framework with regard to 
governance and duties of board members, which 
play	a	significant	role	to	ensure	accountability	and	
control of foundations.  
In addition, external supervisory structures exist 
in all European countries. The main recipient 
of information provided during the lifetime of a 
foundation is the State supervisory authority. The 
authority acts on behalf of various stakeholders 
(founder,	beneficiary,	public	at	large,	donor),	which	all	
have a legitimate interest in the proper management 
of the foundation and the proper pursuit of a 
foundation’s	public-benefit	purpose.	Some	national	
legislations foresee that internal control mechanisms 
be developed through supervisory boards. In many 
countries with stricter transparency requirements, 
where	annual	activity	 reports	and	annual	financial	
information are publicly available, the public at large 
also ensures that a foundation pursues its public-
benefit	purpose	in	line	with	the	will	of	the	founder.		
6.3.3 TAX BENEFITS
In	 exchange	 for	 tax	 benefits,	 the	 State	 expects	
the foundation to undergo increased scrutiny to 
show	that	 it	benefits	the	public	good	and	that	 the	
interests of the general public/all taxpayers are 
protected. The tax authority therefore checks (at the 
latest	when	the	first	tax	declaration	arrives)	whether	
the	 requirements	 for	 tax	 exemption	 are	 fulfilled,	
in	particular	whether	 the	public-benefit	purpose	 is	
pursued. National legislators are free to decide on 
the requirements for the tax-exempt status of a 
foundation (and tax incentives for donors), however 
they appear to all follow some general principles as 
have been outlined in the study.147 
6.3.4 POLITICAL INFLUENCE
Because many foundations aim to tackle society’s 
problems and bring about social change, some 
researchers argue that the public at large has a 
legitimate interest in obtaining information about 
these foundations. Some foundations also act 
as think tanks/give advice to political parties and 
hence engage in political activities (if not in party 
politics) or activities in areas that might otherwise 
fall within the remit of the State. Citizens vote for 
representatives who have the task to ensure that 
their interests and the interests of the general public 
are	 addressed.	 Public-benefit	 foundations	 would	
in these cases act as trustees for the public and 
hence need to inform the public about their actions. 
There was no evidence found that foundation or 
foundation tax law purposely responds to this 
aspect. However, it may indirectly have influenced the 
publicity requirements for all foundations or special 
(tax) rules related to restricting political campaigning 
or support of political party activities. The study did 
not address this aspect in more detail.  
6.3.5 ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST 
Finally, many foundations believe that, since they 
are serving the public good, they have an ethical 
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obligation to undergo regulatory checks and have 
therefore integrated transparency and accountability 
into their management practices, usually beyond 
legislative requirements. Transparency and 
accountability practices are considered key tools 
to	 increase	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 public-
benefit	foundations	and	a	tool	to	build	public	trust	in	
the sector. However, the public cannot assume that 
all	foundations	pursue	such	a	policy	of	“enlightened	
self-interest”	 with	 regards	 to	 transparency	 and	 
accountability, nor can third parties (e.g. donors) rely 
on this, as it is simply an autonomous decision of the 
foundation to conduct itself in this way.  
  
This	“enlightened	self-interest”	in	transparency	and	
accountability plays a key role in the development 
and use of self-regulatory mechanisms and in the 
voluntary transparency and accountability actions 
of	foundations,	which	go	beyond	fulfilling	the	legal	
requirements. 
6.4 IS THERE A NEED FOR MORE PUBLIC 
REGULATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL?
No fundamental gaps were detected in the national 
regulatory frameworks governing foundations’ 
transparency and accountability. The supervisory 
authorities	play	a	sufficiently	strong	role,	although	in	
some countries the tax authority could play a stronger 
role. The information provided appears in most cases 
to be appropriate to enable control/supervision of 
whether	 foundations	 fulfil	 the	 legal	 requirements,	 in	
particular	the	pursuit	of	their	public-benefit	purposes	
(and duties of due diligence). The enforcement 
mechanisms ensure that appropriate measures can 
be undertaken to ensure control. However, there may 
be room for improvement in some cases as outlined 
below: 
6.4.1 REGISTRATION AND ACCESS TO REGISTRATION 
DATA 
In the overwhelming majority of countries, 
foundations are logged in a public register. Among 
common law countries, the UK and Ireland have a 
national system of registering charities.  In most 
civil law countries, however, registration is done by 
legal form. The registration records may therefore 
be distributed among various registration agencies 
or levels of administration. In some countries, this 
raises issues of the accessibility of the registry 
data. The 2009 ECNL study showcased the 
example of Guidestar Europe148, who had sought 
this	 information	 but	 reported	 finding	 this	 difficult	
to accomplish in four civil law countries due to the 
lack,	for	various	reasons,	of	an	official	database.149 At 
the	same	time,	a	valid	official	database	on	NPOs	is	a	
basic requirement in the implementation of the FATF 
SRVIII150, and as such is being considered in several 
European countries (also outside the EU). 
 
6.4.2 SAFEGUARDING THE PURSUIT OF PUBLIC-
BENEFIT PURPOSE
 Two main types of regulatory provisions can be found 
in foundation law and/or tax law and are typically 
used to prevent abuse of foundation property and 
to provide an appropriate basis for tax exemption of 
foundations.151	The	first	set	of	provisions relate to the 
requirement that funds should be spent according 
to	the	designated	public-benefit	purpose,	which	are	
overwhelmingly applied in Europe. Another set of 
accountability measures relate to the promotion of 
effectiveness in the operation of foundations. They 
are a way to ensure that funds are spent not only 
according to the purpose of the foundation, but also 
in	the	most	efficient	way,	thereby	enhancing	overall	
organisational effectiveness. The most typical of 
these are a limitation on administration costs, which 
148 The	GuideStar	project	was	an	initiative	to	develop	a	self-regulatory	model	for	providing	information	on	NPOs	that	is	linked	to	an	official	database	containing	
comprehensive,	valid,	up-to-date	and	independently	verifiable	information	on	NPOs.
149 For example in Germany and Hungary, this was due to the decentralised registration system; while in the Netherlands NPOs - including foundations - are 
registered in the company register and there is no mechanism to separate them out.





















is required by about half of the surveyed countries, 
and requirements for the timely disbursement of 
income. However, there are some questions around 
the	 usefulness	 of	 introducing	 a	 fixed	 limit	 on	
administrative spending into the legislation. Practice 
has	 shown	 that	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 implement	 a	
concrete limit in the law; this can be due to several 
factors, namely that the accounting legislation does 
not support such an approach or that the foundation 
sector is too diverse or too new to have these 
kinds of standards developed. In some Western 
European countries, the commonly accepted level 
of administrative costs for a foundation is included 
in NPO self-regulatory schemes; however, such 
practice is not common as yet in the newer Member 
States.152
6.4.3 GOVERNANCE AND COLLECTIVE BOARD 
STRUCTURE
 The study found that existing governance 
mechanisms	 generally	 provide	 for	 sufficient	
control and accountability. In fact, given 
the huge diversity in the foundation sector, 
governance is one of the areas where 
experience shows it is useful to leave the 
development of good practices to self-regulation. 
As a general rule, the founder(s) have the freedom 
to design the governance structure. However, there 
are some basic public regulatory requirements that 
are seen as necessary in order to ensure foundation 
accountability in most European countries153. One 
requirement is collective governance (i.e. boards 
composed of more than one person) in order to ensure 
appropriate checks and balances in the decision-
making	 process	 (i.e.	 not	 to	make	 the	 fulfilment	 of	
the	public-benefit	purpose	dependent	on	one	person	
as the ultimate decision-maker)154. Currently, just 
over half of European countries mandate more 
than	one	person	on	the	board	of	the	public-benefit	
foundation and in a number of countries a collective 
board structure is suggested by the self-regulatory 
mechanisms used by foundations. 
6.4.4 REPORTING AND ACCESSIBILITY OF REPORTS
 All countries require foundations to prepare annual 
reports, and most countries require them to be 
filed	 with	 the	 relevant	 authorities.	 However,	 they	
differ widely as to the required content and form 
of the reports; how they are submitted and made 
available for the public; and the extent of reporting 
(e.g.	whether	an	audited	financial	report	is	needed	or	
not). In fact, while overall foundations are required 
to account for their annual activities, there is no 
identifiable	 trend	 in	Europe	as	 to	what	constitutes	
good practice, and some gaps may still exist. 
 One issue was raised by the foundations regarding 
financial	 reports,	 namely	 that	 (national	 and	
international) accounting standards are designed 
for	 for-profit	 companies,	 and	 in	 most	 cases	
legislation based on those standards does not 
recognise	 the	 special	 needs	 of	 public-benefit	
foundations. The reference to such accounting 
standards may therefore not be suitable for 
foundations; while the development and use of 
more appropriate standards would also provide 
a means for the authorities and the general public 
to better understand the nature of the work 
foundations do.
 In the majority of countries surveyed, there is a 
general requirement that foundations’ reports 
are made publicly available, but in a third of these 
countries the availability of public information on 
foundations is limited. In just a handful of countries is 
auditing not required. There are a few countries where 
reporting requirements overall could be considered 
to	 be	 “lighter”,	 for	 example	 in	 Finland	 and	 the	 
Netherlands, and in some newer Member States.155 
These countries do not have at least two of the 
152 2009 ECNL Study, page 18.
153 In Cyprus and Greece the governance of public-benefit foundations is not addressed in detail by the law.
154 See Handbook on Governance for Nonprofit Organisations, ECNL.
155 Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia.
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above three types of accountability regulations 
in place (e.g. no requirement to make the report 
publicly available and also no audit requirement).
6.4.5 SUPERVISION
 Foundations are subject to some level of oversight 
in	 every	 country,	 even	 where	 there	 is	 no	 specific	
oversight authority designated for foundations. In 
the majority of countries, supervisory authorities’ 
powers imply inspections and the right to impose 
sanctions on a foundation’s operations in case of 
mismanagement and abuse, but for about a third 
of countries, the power vested in the authorities is 
more limited, for example they may only review and 
ask about reports. However, the level of supervision 
is an area of regulation that depends to a high 
degree on the legal, cultural and historical context of 
individual countries. In a country where supervision 
may seem heavy-handed since there is a designated 
body	with	substantial	staffing	and	wide	competences	
(e.g. the Charity Commission in the UK), this may 
in fact be an asset to foundations, as it provides 
them with guidance and technical assistance in 
improving their accountability and transparency 
practices. Conversely, in some countries (e.g. the 
Netherlands), where reporting and supervision 
are not heavily regulated there is nonetheless a 
high level of compliance simply on account of the 
“rule	of	law”	culture	and	hence	no	need	for	strong	
supervision, as compliance is assumed.
6.5 WHAT IS THE ROLE OF SELF-REGULATORY 
MECHANISMS? 
Self-regulation is a useful tool to enhance transparency 
and	accountability	of	public-benefit	organisations.	
6.5.1 BENEFITS
Overall, self-regulatory codes are more flexible 
than public regulatory frameworks, as they can 
be changed and adapted more easily to new 
trends/developments.	 The	 field	 study	 among	
DAFNE members and other national foundation 
experts showed that the existing transparency and 
accountability elements within the self-regulatory 
mechanisms for foundations are important tools 
for	 improving	 the	 efficiency	 and	 management	 of	
foundations, and for increasing the legitimacy and 
integrity of the sector as a whole. DAFNE members 
identified	 additional	 benefits	 of	 self-regulatory	




•	Promote sound investment policies
•	Build better management standards and coherency
•	Benchmark performance
•	Provide better evaluation/monitoring tools
Cooperation and relationship-building with stakeholders




•	Foster better relations and cooperation with public 
authorities
•	Provide an opportunity to influence government 
practice and legislation and avoid unnecessary 
legislation
Dealing	with	abuse	and	“bad	apples”
•	Prevent potential misuse of support to third parties 
•	Counter public and media suspicion of foundations
•	 Identify and deal with problems before they affect 
the whole sector

































•	Strengthen the sector’s integrity and legitimacy
•	 Improve the image of foundations
6.5.2 CHALLENGES
The study also demonstrated that self-regulation is 
not without challenges, some of which are outlined 
here: 
•	 Self-regulatory	 codes	 and	 standards	 can	 only	
enhance organisational effectiveness of the 
individual foundations that sign up to them. Some 
mechanisms may be too technical or bureaucratic, 
making compliance burdensome. Other 
mechanisms may be too general and therefore 
ineffective. 
•	 The	 promise	 of	 building	 trust	 and	 increasing	
cooperation within and outside the foundation 
community can only be realised if the mechanisms 
are accepted in the sector and among stakeholders. 
This could for example be facilitated if mechanisms 
are developed and promoted through a bottom-
up and participatory process (ideally involving 
external	stakeholders,	especially	beneficiaries	and	
donors). 
•	 Prevention	 of	 misuse	 of	 funds	 or	 detecting	
problems before they affect the whole sector will 
only happen if there is compliance.  
•	 The	benefits	described	above	can	only	be	realised	
if self-regulatory mechanisms gain acceptance 
and are applied within the sector, and gain the 
trust of the general public. This could be achieved 
by further developing and promoting compliance 
and monitoring tools. 
6.5.3 ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF EXISTING SELF-
REGULATORY INITIATIVES
Self-regulatory frameworks are seen by this study 
as important tools to promote an accountable and 
transparent operation of foundations. The sector has 
a responsibility to address governance, accountability 
and effectiveness both collectively and at the level 
of individual foundations through self-regulation 
and individual practices. However, it is important to 
recognise the role and the limits of self-regulation, 
just as it is important to clarify those for public 
regulation.
The study has shown that national level self-
regulatory mechanisms do not necessarily go 
beyond legal requirements. For example from 
among the countries in which activity reporting is 
not required, only a few have this requirement in 
their self-regulatory scheme. Less than half of the 
surveyed foundation codes prescribe or recommend 
reporting obligations beyond the legal requirements. 
Self-regulation of foundations typically addresses the 
need	to	spend	funds	efficiently	and	according	to	the	
public-benefit	purpose;	some	countries	also	address	
issues related to asset management, administrative 
expenses or donor reporting. On the other hand, 
codes in only three countries (Italy, Spain, and UK) 
specifically	 mention	 the	 “know	 your	 donor”	 and	
“know	your	beneficiary”	principle	as	defined	in	anti-
money-laundering and counter-terrorism policies.
Responses related to 13 codes indicate that the self-
regulation mechanism mentions the implementation 
of transparency and accountability towards grantees/
beneficiaries,	 which	 will	 not	 be	 required	 by	 public	
regulation. However, no responses except those 
from Poland and Slovakia and those related to the 
EFC/CoF	principles	reported	on	grantee/beneficiary	
involvement in programme design or governance of 
the foundation in their self-regulatory mechanisms.
This	study	underscores	the	earlier	findings	by	ECNL	
that public regulation and self-regulation are not 
a zero-sum game (i.e. the tenet that where there is 
more self-regulation, less public regulation is needed, 
or vice-versa, does not hold true). Rather, they should 
be considered as complementary tools in achieving 
an optimal state of accountability and transparency.156 
The balance and interplay between these two forms 
of regulation vary widely across Europe, but it can be 
seen that in countries with more developed regulatory 
frameworks for foundations, self-regulation is also 
 156 2009 ECNL Study, page 16.
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more advanced, as a matter of the cultural and 
historical context. 
In the UK and Ireland, the development of public 
regulation and self-regulation has been parallel and 
the role of both is equally important. In most of the 
“old”	EU	Member	States	with	a	civil	law	system	(e.g.,	
France, Germany, the Scandinavian countries) public 
regulation plays a slightly bigger role than self-
regulation, but self-regulation mechanisms are more 
advanced than in the Central and Eastern European 
countries	 (“new”	 Member	 States).	 The	 latter	 have	
less developed NPO sectors and the role of public 
regulation is more substantial than the role of self-
regulation.157
Self-regulatory mechanisms of European foundations 
tend to lack compliance mechanisms and there is 
generally no strict monitoring of the application and 
impact of these mechanisms. Strong monitoring 
was reported by only very few countries and is 
generally more developed in codes for fundraising 
foundations. This does not mean of course that 
individual foundations do not apply monitoring or 
that they are not following the good practices set 
out in self-regulatory mechanisms or elsewhere 
(such assessment is beyond the scope of this study). 
However, it points to the need to ensure more 
consistent follow-up of such initiatives. More broadly 
speaking, there seems to be a lack of incentives to 
maintain (and review and improve) the system once 
it	 is	developed.	This	also	makes	 it	more	difficult	 to	
fulfil	 the	 long-term	goals	of	strengthening	 integrity	
and legitimacy and creating an improved image of 
the sector.
As regards the impact of self-regulation, while 
several members of DAFNE reported positive 
impacts particularly in regard to internal 
organisational development of the foundation (e.g. 
better management practices, clearer separation 
of functions, improved accounting/monitoring 
systems), there was less evidence in terms of the 
other positive outcomes. In particular, there was very 
little reported on preventing abuse or government 
over-regulation. The expected prevention of 
government over-regulation through self-regulation 
may seem elusive. Practice shows that effective self-
regulation tends to build on a sound and relatively 
sophisticated regulatory system as its foundation.158 
In fact, in those countries where self-regulation is 
already strong, it can lessen the existing regulatory 
burden as the government could recognise that it 
may	leave	certain	issues	“in	the	safe	hands”	of	self-
regulatory bodies (as in the corporate sector). Ideally, 
this can lead to a co-regulatory model.159 However, 
when self-regulation is still emerging and there are 
no clear compliance mechanisms it is unlikely to 
prevent governments from introducing additional 
requirements, if there is a perceived need to increase 
transparency and accountability for the sector.
157 2009 ECNL Study, page 17
158 Almost half of the self-regulatory initiatives identified in the 2009 ECNL Study came from the UK and the Netherlands,countries with arguable highly 
developed regulatory schemes, while very few were identified in the new Member States.




















7.1 KEY CONCLUSIONS 
During recent years, there has been a great deal of 
interest in the accountability and transparency of 
public-benefit	foundations	from	various	stakeholders.	
The driving force behind most recent self-regulatory 
and legislative initiatives appears to be the increased 
economic importance of the sector and not counter-
terrorism action, which needs to be acknowledged 
among policy-makers at the national and EU level. 
The main rationale for having (self-) regulation 
governing the transparency and accountability of 
public-benefit	foundations	is	threefold:
•	The governance structure of foundations lacks 
the	 “safety	 valve”	 of	 owners	 or	 shareholders	who	
have a vested self-interest in ensuring that the 
public-benefit	 purpose	 is	 pursued	 and	 controlling	
governance against abuse).
•	Having	public-benefit	status/being	in	receipt	of	tax	
exemptions increases the demand for accountability 
to the public and the State.
•	Foundations aim to tackle the society’s problems and 
bring about social change, and therefore have a duty 
to account to the public.
 
The comparative analysis shows that there are 
no fundamental gaps within the legal frameworks 
that govern the accountability and transparency of 
public-benefit	foundations	 in	Europe.	 In	all	countries,	
a certain minimum standard is guaranteed: Public-
benefit	 foundations	 are	 duty	 bound	 to	 use	 their	
assets	 to	 pursue	 public-benefit	 purposes	 instead	 of	
promoting	 private-benefit	 purposes.	 There	 are	 clear	
control	 mechanisms	 in	 place	 that	 ensure	 a	 “safety	
valve”	 against	 abuse,	 including	 reporting/auditing	
requirements, governance requirements and state 
supervision. Information about foundations’ status and 
activities are sent, when requested and appropriate, to 
the state supervisory authority (in foundation law), 
the tax authority (in tax law) and are shared with the 
general public (either directly or via the authorities). 
The	 information	 provided	 enables	 sufficient	 control/
supervision	 of	 whether	 foundations	 fulfil	 their	 legal	
requirements, in particular the pursuit of their public-
benefit	 purposes	 and,	 for	 governing	 organs,	 their	
duties of due diligence and care. 
However, while no fundamental gaps in legislation 
were detected, there may be room to improve the 
rules on accountability and transparency in some 
cases. The potential for further development of the 
regulatory frameworks with regard to the access to 
registration data, ensuring good governance, and 
effective reporting and supervision was highlighted in 
some countries. 
A comparative mapping and analysis of existing self-
regulatory mechanisms in Europe revealed that these 
are flexible tools that optimise the effectiveness, 
accountability	 and	 transparency	 of	 public-benefit	
foundations. As always, there are opportunities to 
better structure and monitor the self-regulatory 
codes and standards in some countries, while greater 
awareness-raising about these mechanisms could lead 
to increased compliance with the mechanisms and 
recognition of their effectiveness in the sector and 
beyond. 
The	 findings	 of	 the	mappings	 and	 analyses	 suggest	
that there is no need for a European regulation on 
the	transparency	and	accountability	of	public-benefit	
foundations, given that existing regulations provide 
appropriate	 tools.	 A	 “one	 size	 fits	 all”	 solution	 at	
European level would not be possible given the 
different legal traditions and cultures of the Member 
States. Accountability and transparency is achieved in 
a number of ways and through different mechanisms 
and concepts. Hence there is no single model/
solution to uphold transparency and accountability, 
and harmonisation of national legislation is neither 
possible nor wanted. A new, optional, supranational 
legal form, such as the currently discussed European 
Foundation, would be helpful, because it could serve as 
a benchmark on accountability, transparency and good 
governance across the EU and beyond. 
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7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
7.2.1 FOR FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR UMBRELLA 
ORGANISATIONS
Foundations should engage in discussions around 
minimum standards and best practices on transparency 
and accountability in Europe, and participate in a 
benchmarking exercise not only to identify existing 
practices, but also to examine their relevance and 
impact in given contexts. Doing this could also 
increase understanding of how the key principles of 
transparency and accountability can be effectively 
applied in different environments by regulatory and 
self-regulatory measures.
There is a need for enhanced dialogue at the national 
level with decision-makers, governments, and 
legislators, to influence the political debate about 
the role of foundations and to strategically position 
foundations as part of the solution, rather than part 
of the problem, in the policy arena. Meanwhile, self-
regulatory initiatives in the foundation sector should 
seek synergies with public regulation processes at 
national and EU levels.
Foundations/their umbrella organisations should be 
more attentive to the implementation and enforcement 
of existing self-regulatory mechanisms by:
•	Periodically reviewing and improving existing codes
•	Developing more guidelines as to how they can be 
effectively implemented
•	Consider developing indicators for a monitoring 
system and potential sanctions for non-compliance
•	 Identifying	benefits	that	the	mechanism	can	bring	to	
internal and external stakeholders (through surveys, 
case studies etc.)
7.2.2 FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
National governments should continue to develop 
a	 more	 enabling	 legal	 and	 fiscal	 environment	 for	
foundations by, among other things, developing 
accounting	 standards	 that	 better	fit	 their	 needs,	 and	
by more widely applying the principle of proportionality 
with regards to reporting requirements and in other 
regulations.
Governments should also seek to involve foundations 
in a participatory (i.e. not only consultative) policy 
development process in addressing issues relating to 
the whole NPO sector’s transparency and accountability, 
and	 specifically	 in	 regard	 to	 legislation	 on	 counter-
terrorism	and	counter-terrorist	financing.
Member States of the EU should support and 
supplement the EU-level process for information-
sharing and research. 
7.2.3 FOR THE EU
The EU should assume a more proactive role 
in facilitating exchange of best practices in the 
development and implementation of regulations and 
self-regulatory initiatives relating to accountability 
and transparency of foundations among its Member 
States, as well as among government and civil society 
organisations. One option would be to initiate and host 
a stakeholder dialogue as part of a wider platform 
for exchange among the Member States. A dialogue 
between	 public-benefit	 foundations,	 the	 wider	 NPO	
sector and policy makers at national and EU level on 
accountability and transparency would help ensure 
that the EU is well informed about public and self-
regulatory processes at the national level and that any 
action from the EU builds on, rather than duplicates, 
such efforts at the national level. Furthermore such 
dialogue would help to clarify the role of the European 
Commission in assisting national level processes and 




















This section describes the tools and methodology that 
were used to conduct the study.
8.1 STUDY TEAM AND ROLES
The study team was composed of an international 
team of experts, including legal experts (with a special 
knowledge of the law of foundations, taxation of non-
profit	 organisations,	 and	 European	 Union	 law),	 and	
practitioners with practical experience in foundation 
matters:
•	The EFC member-led Legal Committee and EFC 
Legal Department staff, who together support one 
of the EFC’s core objectives of creating an enabling 
environment for foundations and corporate funders 
in Europe. 
•	Members of the DAFNE network.
•	A network of foundation law experts in the 27 EU 
Member States, as well as Switzerland, Turkey and 
Ukraine,	 which	 put	 country-specific	 information	
together in the form of the EFC’s online Legal and 
Fiscal	Country	Profiles,	which	were	a	key	 resource	
for this study. 
•	The	European	Center	for	Not-for-profit	Law	(ECNL)	
and Thomas von Hippel, freelance researcher, served 
as external consultants to the study.
•	ECNL along with the EFC Legal Committee and the 
DAFNE network acted as peer reviewers, reviewing 
the methodology of the study as well as the 




to country.160 Nevertheless, there is a common thread 
of characteristics which European foundations share 
and which are highlighted in the proposed working 
definition:
An independent organisation (generally with its own 
legal personality), is supervised by a State supervisory 
authority,	 and	 serves	 a	 public-benefit	 purpose	
(in some Member States: any lawful purpose), for 
which a founder has provided a starting capital and 
determined the foundation’s purpose and statutes.161
The	 study	 focused	 on	 public-benefit	 foundations,	
which are the most common type of foundation in 
Europe.162
8.2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY
For the purposes of this study, accountability is 
understood as an obligation or willingness of a public-
benefit	foundation	to	account	for	its	actions	towards	
its	 multiple	 stakeholders	 (including	 beneficiaries,	
donors, and governments, as well as the public at 
large).163
8.2.3 TRANSPARENCY 
For the purposes of this study, transparency is 
understood as an obligation or willingness of public-
benefit	 foundations	 to	 publish	 and	make	 available	
data about: 
•	Their organisations (e.g. basic data regarding 
establishment: name, address, purpose, founder, 
decision-making body) 
•	Finances (e.g. publishing financial reports, 
undergoing audits) 
•	Programmes and operations (e.g. publishing annual 
activity reports)164
8.2.4 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
For the purpose of this study transparency is 
considered an indispensable mechanism for 
enacting accountability. A foundation provides 
certain information to the various stakeholders 
160 This is clearly illustrated in the EFC’s Legal and Fiscal Country Profiles and Comparative Highlights of Foundation Laws, 2011.
161 Definition corresponds to a large extent to that included in the Feasibility Study on the European Foundation Statute, 2009, page 13.
162 In many countries the foundation law does not make a clear difference between private-interest and public-benefit foundations, the distinction being made 
only by tax law. A public-benefit status exists in many countries, even where a foundation can only be created for public-benefit purposes. Where appropriate, 
the study includes laws concerning all foundations, and puts special emphasis on rules governing foundations that have a public-benefit purpose, have 
received public benefit status, or are otherwise fall under such definition (depending on the legal system). For the purposes of this study, trusts (where they 
exist) and similar legal institutions and arrangements will be treated as functionally comparable to foundations and are, therefore, included in the scope of 
the study.
163 Definition based on that used in the 2009 ECNL Study.
164 Definition based on that used in the 2009 ECNLStudy.
8. METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS
EXPLORING TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY REGULATION OF PUBLIC-BENEFIT FOUNDATIONS IN EUROPE
(including	 beneficiaries,	 donors,	 and	 governments,	
as well as the public at large) throughout the various 
stages of its lifetime. Sometimes the information is 
provided directly to the stakeholders and sometimes 
it is supplied through agents (e.g. the supervisory 
or tax authority, who act on behalf of the general 
public).	Public-benefit	foundations	can	only	account	
for their actions towards their multiple stakeholders 
if	 they	 share	 relevant	 and	 sufficient	 information	
about themselves. 
8.3 METHODOLOGY
The following methodology was used to capture data on 
both regulatory and self-regulatory initiatives related 
to	the	transparency	and	accountability	of	public-benefit	
foundations in Europe: 
8.3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW
The EFC reviewed and researched existing 
literature and information on national foundation 
laws, and related transparency and accountability 
requirements. The EFC worked with its network of 
foundation law and foundation tax law experts to 
tackle any questions that arose in the review and 
provide the latest legal and tax updates. The following 
literature and information were reviewed:
•	 EFC Country Legal and Fiscal Profiles165
 Contains an overview of the diverse legal and fiscal 
environments of foundations across 30 countries 
(the 27 EU Member States, plus Switzerland, 
Ukraine and Turkey), drafted by national country 
experts. The structure was designed by the EFC’s 
membership-driven Legal Committee in co-
operation with legal experts. 
•	 Stiftungsrecht in Europa166
 Contains a number of country reports as well as 
an analysis on selected foundation law topics. 
Because of recent legal reforms, some of the 
individual country information must be considered 
outdated. Nevertheless, the comparative analysis 
is a valuable source for analysis and debate on 
European foundation law among legal scholars. 
•	 The European Foundation167
 Includes a thorough analysis of the rationale, the 
function and the reality of European foundation 
laws. In addition to giving recommendations on 
how a European legal form for foundations could 
look, the publication contains a comparative 
analysis of all relevant aspects of foundation 
laws and the laws on foundation taxation (but not 
selected country reports). 
•	 Handbuch des internationalen Stiftungsrechts168
 Contains some extensive country reports169 as well 
as analyses of tax law and European law topics.
•	 Feasibility Study on a European Foundation 
Statute170
 Provides an overview of the main types of 
foundations in EU Member States as well as their 
economic scale and regulatory environment. The 
study also examines the barriers to cross-border 
activities and their cost implications; as well as 
the role of a European Foundation Statute in 
eliminating these barriers and its further possible 
effects.
165 Last published as a hard copy in May 2007 and updated electronically in 2010 and 2011.
166 Hopt/Reuter, 2001.
167 Hopt/Walz/von Hippel/Then, 2006.
168 Richter/Wachter, 2007.
169 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, England, France, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and Spain.




















•	 Study on Recent Public and Self-Regulatory 
Initiatives Enhancing Transparency and 
Accountability of Non-profit Organizations (NPOs) 
in the European Union171
 Provides analyses of more than 140 regulatory 
initiatives concerning the transparency and 
accountability	 of	 NPOs	 over	 the	 last	 five	 years	
in the 27 EU Member States. The Study was 
commissioned by the European Commission with 





The EFC Legal Committee, DAFNE and ECNL compiled 
a set of key issues to be covered by the regulatory 
mapping of the study in the form of a questionnaire 
together	 with	 some	 agreed	 definitions.	 The	 EFC	
Secretariat conducted the mapping and collected the 
information during autumn/winter 2010 and spring 
2011. 
8.3.3 FIELD STUDY ON SELF-REGULATION
The DAFNE network provided the EFC with English 
translations of their relevant self-regulatory 
measures, or sections thereof. The network also 
answered a questionnaire (see Annex I) developed 
jointly by the EFC, DAFNE and ECNL to identify key 
elements of existing self-regulatory mechanisms 
with regard to transparency and accountability. 
This information gathering was followed up 
with (telephone) interviews on questions of 
implementation etc., where appropriate.
8.3.4 ANALYSIS
The EFC Secretariat compiled comparative charts, 
as well as short summaries on the regulatory and 
soft law approaches in the various countries based 
on	the	findings	of	the	mapping.	ECNL	and	Thomas	
von Hippel worked in close cooperation with the 
EFC Legal Committee and the DAFNE network to 
analyse the data and comparisons, and drafted the 
conclusions with a view to identifying commonalities 
and trends across countries as well as areas for 
possible future action, taking into account recent 
initiatives/recommendations on NPOs’ transparency 
and accountability developed by the European 
Commission.
171 European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL), 2009.
172 Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee: The Prevention of and Fight against 
Terrorist Financing through enhanced national level coordination and greater transparency of the non-profit sector, 29/11/2005. COM(2005) 620 final.
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1. Title	of	code	of	conduct	for	public-benefit	foundations	and	initiating	organisation.
2. If	a	certification	system	is	used,	what	method	of	certification	is	used	(e.g.	self-,	peer,	or	third	party	certification)?	
3. Are details of participating organisations logged in a database or information service? 
4. What is the scope of the self-regulation mechanism? Is it internal only, a foundations’ initiative (e.g. Donors Forum), 
or another kind of initiative (e.g. European Foundation for Quality Management) 
5. Does the self-regulation mechanism have any international (EU or cross-border) scope? 
6. Content	of	the	self-regulation	mechanism	-	Are	there	specific	rules	concerning:	
- Board of directors (responsibilities, nomination, remuneration etc.)
- Human resources policies 
- Conflict of interest policies
7. Reporting requirements: What kind of reporting is suggested/required? Does the self-regulation mechanism re-
quire:
- The maintaining of reports/accounts and observance of transparency with respect to income, expenditure and 
assets?
- The publication of annual accounts/reports (even if this is not required by law)?
8. Does the self-regulation mechanism contain requirements regarding the use of funds? If yes, which ones?
9. Are	there	specific	rules	regarding:
- Implementation of principles of transparency and accountability towards grantees/beneficiaries?
- Commitments made towards grantees/beneficiaries? 
- Involvement of grantees/beneficiaries in programme design and evaluation?






11. Does the self-regulation document prescribe any compliance mechanisms? If yes, what are these?
12. Do individual foundations announce anywhere that they adhere to soft-law approaches (website, annual report 
etc.)? How is the self-regulation mechanism promoted among a wider audience (public, media, donors, grantees 
etc.)?
13. How do internal stakeholders perceive the issue of increased demand for transparency and accountability? 
14. How do external stakeholders (media/donors/decision-makers/grantees) view the self-regulation initiatives? How 
has this been measured?
15. Have any negative effects of an open policy been reported? If yes, which ones?
16. Have soft-law approaches actually amended foundations’ practices for the better?
17. Has	misuse	of	grants	by	beneficiaries	for	criminal	purposes	ever	been	an	issue	in	your	country?
ANNEX I 























INLCUDED IN THE FIELD STUDY 
INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY 
TITLE OF INITIATIVE/ INITIATING ORGANISATION/
DATE ADOPTED 
Network of Belgian Foundations, Belgium Déclaration	 de	 Base	 -	 Réseau	 de	 Fondations	 Belges	 (RFB)”	 /	 
Basisverklaring Belgisch Netwerk van Stichtingen (2003)
Bulgarian Donors Forum, Bulgaria Code of Ethics (2004)
Czech Donors Forum, Czech Republic Code of Ethics (2004)
Realdania, Denmark Danish Principles of Good Practice for Charitable Foundations 
(2008); A group of Danish Foundations 
Open Estonia Foundation, Estonia Code	 of	 Ethics	 (2002);	 Roundtable	 of	 Estonian	 Non-Profit	 
Organisations, 
Council of Finnish Foundations, Finland Good Foundation Practice (GFP) (2006)
French Centre for Funds and Foundations, France Comité	de	la	Charte	du	don	en	confiance	(1989);	
French Centre for Funds and Foundations, France IDEAS Guide of Good Practices (2008); IDEAS
Association of German Foundations, Germany Basics of Good Foundation Practice (2006)
Philanthropy Ireland, Ireland Irish Charities Tax Reform Group, Guiding Principles for Fundraising 
(2008)
Philanthropy Ireland, Ireland A Guide to Effective Giving (2010) 
Association of Italian Foundations and Savings Banks (ACRI), Italy Guidelines	for	a	“Code	of	Ethics”	(2008)
Banque de Luxembourg, Luxembourg Code de bonne conduite des organismes faisant appel à la géné-
rosité	du	public	(Code	de	bonne	conduite)	(2007);	A	group	of	five	
major Luxembourg foundations 
Association of Foundations in the Netherlands (FIN) Code of Conduct (2004; updated 2010)
Polish Donors Forum, Poland Standards of the Polish Donors Forum (2004) 
Portuguese Foundation Centre, Portugal Principles of Good Practice (2008)
Romanian Donors Forum, Romania Code of Ethics 
Slovak Donors Forum, Slovakia Code of Ethics (2000) and Standards of Foundation Practice 
Spanish Association of Foundations, Spain Principles of the Spanish Association of Foundations (2008), 
and Model Statutes and guidance on developing codes of good 
practice (2011)
Spanish Association of Foundations, Spain Ethical Code for Foundations, Andalusian Association of Foundations 
Spanish Association of Foundations, Spain Ethical Code and Good Government of Foundations, Coordinating 
Committee of Catalonian Foundations
Spanish Association of Foundations, Spain Principles of Transparency and Best Practice, Fundación Lealtad
Spanish Association of Foundations, Spain Code of Conduct Coordinating Committee of Development 
Cooperation NGOs
Association of Charitable Foundations, United Kingdom Guidelines:	“Tackling	external	grant	fraud:	a	guide	to	help	chari-
table	trusts	and	foundations	deter	and	detect	fraud”	(2007)	
The Russia Donors Forum, Russia Code of Ethics Russian Donors Forum (2001)
SwissFoundations, Switzerland Swiss	Foundation	Code	(2009;	first	edition	was	2005)
Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TÜSEV), Turkey TUSEV’s members database
European Foundation Centre (EFC) Principles of Good Practice (2006)
European Foundation Centre (EFC) / Council on Foundations (CoF) Principles of Accountability for International Philanthropy (2007)
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